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I. INTRODUCTION

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment.
It is beyond question that some lies-such as perjury and fraud-are
simply not covered by the Constitution's free speech clause.' But it is
equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military
honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. 2 Until very
recently, however, it has been taken for granted in Supreme Court
doctrine and academic writing that any constitutional protection for lies
is purely prophylactic-it provides protection to the truth-speaker by
also incidentally protecting the liar. What remains unresolved is
whether other rationales might also justify First Amendment
protection for lies.
This Article argues that some lies-what we call high value
lies-have instrumental value that advances the goals underlying
freedom of speech. It develops a trifurcated doctrinal taxonomy of
constitutional protection for lies. Some misrepresentations receive no
protection at all; 3 some false statements are protected only because the
protection of the liar ensures that the speech of the truthful person is
not indirectly chilled, 4 and, in our view, some lies must be protected for
their own sake.5 This framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally
important because we provide the first comprehensive look at the wide
range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues in the wake of

1.
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012). See also United States v.
Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 400 (4th Cir. 2012). There is an important difference between what speech
is covered by the First Amendment and what speech is protected. As Professor Schauer has
observed, the question of First Amendment coverage is all too often "simply assumed." Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004).
2.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (finding that non-intentional, non-reckless false speech that injures reputation of public
officials is protected by the First Amendment).
3.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012) (upheld in United States v. Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d
1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also discussion infra Sections II.A-B.
4.
See discussion infra, Section II.C.; see also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 776-77 (1986) ("[In] placing the burden of showing truth on defendants, there would be some
cases in which defendants could not bear their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact
true.").
5.
See discussion infra Section II.D.
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United States v. Alvarez,6 and analyze the proper level of constitutional
scrutiny applicable to regulations of each type of lie.
Beyond doctrine, we advance the thesis that constitutional
protection for high value lies is firmly rooted in First Amendment
theory because false speech can paradoxically facilitate or produce
truth. High value lies, though unacknowledged in the literature and
cases to date, have played an important role in American history, and
affirmatively further the three most commonly invoked theoretical
goals of free speech-enhancing political discourse, revealing truth, and
promoting individual autonomy.' A prototypical category of high value
lies is what we label "investigative deceptions." An investigative
deception is the sort of misrepresentation necessary for an undercover
journalist, investigator, or political activist to gain access to information
or images of great political significance that would not be available if
the person disclosed her media affiliations or political objectives.
affirmative
intentional,
are
deceptions
Investigative
misrepresentations or omissions about one's political or journalistic
affiliations, educational backgrounds, or research, reportorial, or
political motives to facilitate gaining access to truthful information on
matters of substantial public concern.8

132 S. Ct. 2537.
6.
These are the most widely articulated justifications for the constitutional protection of
7.
expression under contemporary free speech theory. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 744 (16th ed. 2007). We are aware of only two previous scholarly
treatments of the First Amendment coverage of the types of lies we discuss here. See generally
Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat
CuriousRelationship, 53 UCLAL. REV. 1107 (2006); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 161. In examining lies more generally, Professor Varat's insightful article includes
a subsection on "Lies Designed to Procure the Truth," which sets out some of the challenges that
we address comprehensively in this Article. Varat, supra, at 1122-26. In trying to predict the
implications of the Court's decision in Alvarez, Professor Norton acknowledges that "[s]ome lies
have instrumental or even moral value," Norton, supra, at 164, though she does not emphasize the
types of investigative deceptions on which our work focuses. For an argument that lying may
sometimes be protected speech on moral grounds, see R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom of
Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1131, 1157-58 (2011). But see generally SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN,
SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAw (2014) (arguing that government regulation
of lies advances social interests in protecting moral agency in human communication and is not
incompatible with freedom of speech). For other interesting work addressing more generally the
issue of lying and the Constitution, see generally Steven Gey, The First Amendment and the
Disseminationof Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Frederick Schauer,
Factsand the FirstAmendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010).
For examples of the use of investigative deception in undercover investigations, see
8.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1015 (D. Idaho 2014) (investigating animal
abuse in agricultural facilities); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366-68 (1982)
(uncovering Fair Housing Act violations with the use of testers "to make equal opportunity in
housing a reality in the Richmond Metropolitan area").
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We develop our claim by examining the confluence of two
contemporary developments in the law of free speech-the Supreme
Court's decision in Alvarez, and the emergence of new laws aimed at
stifling undercover investigations or whistleblowing, particularly the
so-called "Ag Gag" laws. 9 Ag Gag laws provide a timely and
straightforward case study of the First Amendment's role in protecting
high value lies because a key component of these laws is the
criminalization of misrepresentations made in order to gain access to
agricultural facilities.' 0 Under these laws, lies used to facilitate
information gathering for a news story," an academic book,1 2 or
political mobilization 3 are criminalized.14
At least since Upton Sinclair lied to gain critical access to the
meatpacking industry to gather information for his novel, The Jungle,
investigators have been misrepresenting their identities and motives to
expose unlawful and unethical behavior to the light of day.15 This
9.
The term "Ag Gag" was coined by food writer Mark Bittman. Mark Bittman, Op-Ed., Who
Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A27. As we discuss below, Ag Gag laws seek
to stifle whistleblowing and reporting regarding practices at commercial agricultural facilities.
Several articles have addressed the First Amendment implications of Ag Gag laws from a doctrinal
perspective, but none have situated the discussion against the background of First Amendment
theory. See, e.g., Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionalityof Laws Restricting Undercover
Investigationson Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960 (2012); Larissa U. Liebmann,
Fraudand FirstAmendment Protections of False Speech: How United States v. Alvarez Impacts
Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 566 (2014).
10.
Since 2012, more than twenty-five such bills have been introduced. See Ag-Gag Bills at
the

State

Level,

AM.

Soc'Y

FOR

THE

PREVENTION

OF

CRUELTY

TO

ANIMALS,

http://www.aspea.org/fight-cruelty/advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislation/
ag-gag-bills-state-level [http://perma.cc/GLB3-S3SX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015); Eliza Barclay, 2013
Was The Year Bills To CriminalizeAnimal Cruelty Videos Failed, NPR (Dec. 27, 2013, 10:39 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/12/19/255549796/2013-was-the-year-every-new-ag-gag-billfailed [http://perma.cc/66SS-EGHF]; Ariel Garlow, Why Factory Farms Are Afraid of Us Looking
In, ONE GREEN PLANET (June 24, 2014), http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/whythe-factory-farms-are-afraid-of-us-looking-in/ [http://perma.cc/ZHT4-SYU3].
11.
See, e.g., Harper's Magazine, Ted Conover Goes Undercover as a USDA Meat Inspector,
THE HARPER'S BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013, 2:37 AM), http://harpers.org/blog/2013/04/ted-conover-goesundercover-as-a-usda-meat-inspector/ [http://perma.cc/VNV3-CYA6].
12.
See, e.g., TIMOTHY PACHIRAT, EVERY TWELVE SECONDS: INDUSTRIALIZED SLAUGHTER
AND THE POLITICS OF SIGHT 15-17 (2011).

&

13.
See, e.g., Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969-70 (2012) (undercover video
exposing animal abuse in slaughterhouse prompted change in statute governing treatment of
animals).
14.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(a) (2014). Many Ag Gag laws also criminalize
the act of recording itself, which raises equally important First Amendment concerns. In a future
article, we examine more specifically the concept of image capture as speech. Justin Marceau
Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming May
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644551 [http://perma.cc/236N-88SC]. For a general treatment of
this topic, see Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 370-74 (2011).
15.
See infra notes 122-152 and accompanying text.
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Article is the first to consider the relationship between these high value
lies and the First Amendment. In Part II, we explore the current
jurisprudence and scholarship about lying under the First Amendment.
Here, we trace the development of the law from earlier understandings
that seemed to categorically exclude lying from First Amendment
coverage, to a contemporary, post-Alvarez, binary understanding of free
speech theory-some lies are protected and others are not. In Part III,
we explore the interaction of the practical realities of lying-a complex
and varied social phenomena-and the theoretical underpinnings of the
First Amendment. We demonstrate that investigative deceptions are
valuable as a historical and political matter and that they ought not to
be relegated to the status of valueless speech. Next, we argue in Part
IV that these lies affirmatively serve the purposes of free speech-they
promote democratic self-governance, enhance the search for broader
16
truths, and facilitate speakers' autonomy and self-determination.
Finally, in Part V, we build on this to show how Ag Gag laws and other
government regulations of lying as part of undercover investigations
ought to be evaluated within the framework of existing First
Amendment doctrine. In short, we introduce, define, and provide a
doctrinal framework for understanding high value lies under the First
Amendment.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE TREATMENT
OF LIES As EXPRESSION

As far back as the early twentieth century, the Court articulated
a principle of free speech familiar to most laypeople-you can't falsely
shout fire in a crowded theater.1 7 This common platitude embodies two
underlying premises supporting the claim that false factual statements
are not protected by the First Amendment: (1) they have no value (false
factual statements do not promote democracy, do not, by definition,
advance the search for truth, and do not contribute anything, or
anything substantial, to the speaker's autonomy); and (2) they can cause
tangible social harm (unnecessarily alarming people might cause panic,
18
leading to physical injuries).
See infra notes 217-256 and accompanying text.
16.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
17.
18. Although two-level speech theory focuses primarily on the value of expression, the Court
also tends to examine the social harms associated with a category of speech when determining
whether it is covered by the First Amendment. For categories of expression deemed unprotected,
the Court's normal mistrust of government justifications is set aside, not only because these types
of speech have no or little value, but also because the states' interests are not speculative, but
tangible and easily understood. Thus, fighting words may have no value, but they also arguably
may provoke immediate physical violence. Obscenity is said not to facilitate any traditional speech
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But in law, as in life, not all lies are alike. Accordingly, in
examining whether some lies ought to receive First Amendment
protection, it is important to understand precisely why the Court has
tolerated laws that regulate false speech and to distinguish among the
different types of false statements based on the value they provide or
the harm they cause to society.
A. Lies as No Value Speech
Free speech doctrine under the First Amendment has long been
understood to follow the so-called two-level speech theory.1 9 Under this
approach, speech that is considered to have "high value" is entitled to
robust, though not unlimited, First Amendment protection. 20 Under
much free speech theory, the value of a type of expression is measured
in an instrumental sense by determining that expression's contribution
to the First Amendment's core functions-promotion of democratic selfgovernance, 21 facilitating the broader search for truth (beyond the
political realm), 22 and enhancing the speaker's self-realization and
autonomy. 23 High value speech is subject to the most stringent
constitutional protection, and typically cannot be regulated on the basis
of the speaker's viewpoint or the content of her expression. 24
In contrast, on a more or less case-by-case basis, the Supreme
Court has determined that some categories of speech fall entirely
outside the First Amendment's coverage. 25 This second tier of speech is

value, but some people argue that it also may undermine societal morals and cause harm to
women. And so forth.
19. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth Karst's Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 43 (2008) (discussing the application of the "two-level" theory);
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (describing the permissibility of government
regulation of "certain categories of expression").
20.
See Black, 538 U.S. at 358-59 (noting the constitutionality of restrictions on speech in
limited areas of low value).
21.

See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-

GOVERNMENT 75 (1948); Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971).
22.
See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Yale University Press, 2003) (1859)
(exploring individual rights in relationship to society and government).
23.
See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982);
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 217-18 (1972).
Other theorists argue that such constructivist or consequentialist approaches are not helpful to
understanding free speech. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION? 131 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free
Speech Theory, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 647, 690-91 (2013).
24.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
25.
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (describing the categories of
unprotected speech).
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made up of essentially unprotected expressive activities.2 6 Absent
another constitutional limitation, the government may regulate or even
ban speech that falls outside of the free speech clause.2 7 While the twolevel theory of speech has been incisively criticized for decades, 28 the
Supreme Court at least formally clings to the approach as part of its
doctrinal implementation of the First Amendment. 29
The longest standing expression of the two-level theory comes
from the often quoted dictum in the Court's fighting words case,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.30 There, in declaring that speech rights
under the First Amendment are not absolute, the Court listed several
categories of speech that fall beyond its coverage. "There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting' words."31 In addition
to the implied historical pedigree 32 of these categories of unprotected
speech, the Court articulated a functional rationale for their exclusion
from the First Amendment. "[S]uch utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 33 Simply put,
under the two-level theory, some types of speech have little or no value,
and therefore receive no protection.

See discussion infra Section II.B.
26.
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-83, 485 (1957) (holding that "obscenity is
27.
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press" and outlining the history of
unprotected speech); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (explaining that "true threats"
are not covered by the First Amendment).
28. E.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 551 (1989); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-12 (1960).
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 ("From 1791 to the present, however, the First Amendment has
29.
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. These [are] historic and traditional categories
long familiar to the bar.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
30.
Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
31.
In a recent article, Genevieve Lakier discredits this historical narrative and
32.
demonstrates that neither the Supreme Court nor other federal or state courts in the period prior
to the New Deal routinely recognized categories of low value speech. See Genevieve Lakier, The
Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2177-79 (2015). Indeed, there was both
more and less First Amendment protection for categories of speech that the modern Court deems
as having no or little value. On one hand, prior restraints were presumptively invalid for all
categories of speech. Id. at 2179-81. On the other hand, criminal penalties on both high and low
value speech were tolerated much more than they are today. Id.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
33.
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Among the categories of unprotected, or only partially protected,
expression are several types of speech that involve false statements of
fact, or more bluntly, lies and misrepresentations. The Supreme Court
has long suggested that "there is no such thing as a false idea,"34
premised on the notion that truth is optimally derived from free and
open discourse, including the rebuttal and challenge of even the most
outrageous or "false" ideas or beliefs.36 Untruthful statements of fact
are another matter, because they are said to neither advance public
discourse nor promote individual self-realization. 36
For decades, then, it was assumed that false factual statements
are of no value to public discourse and thus fall entirely outside of the
First Amendment's protections. The Court's rhetoric was unequivocal
on this point. For example, it repeatedly observed that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact." 3 7 Similarly, it declared
that "[n]either lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First
Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further
proliferation." 38 In equally clear language, the Court confirmed that
"the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with
reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection."3 9
Through these repeated and definitive holdings, it became axiomatic
that lying is valueless speech and is therefore not covered by the First
Amendment. 40
But the claim that lies have no value was never closely
examined. 41 Lies have been painted with too broad a brush. They are
assumed to lack value, but little or no effort has been spent trying to
differentiate among types of lies. The remainder of this section takes up
this task of creating a taxonomy of lies, and explores whether
differences among lies ought to lead to a distinction in the degree of
constitutional protection to which they are afforded.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
34.
35.
Id. at 339-40 ("However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.").
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
36.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
37.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
38.
39.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
389 (1967) ("[T]he constitutional [speech] guarantees can tolerate sanctions against calculated
falsehoods without significant impairment of their essential function.") (emphasis added)).
40. Not all falsehoods are equal. It is possible to unknowingly provide false information, or
even to do so negligently. At least in the context of public figures, only statements that are
knowingly or recklessly false are actionable as defamatory. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 280 (1964). Unless otherwise specified, when we refer to lies or misrepresentations, we are
referring to intentionalfalsehoods.
See SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 122 (describing Court as having "an extended flirtation
41.
with the broad proposition" that false factual speech has no First Amendment value).
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B. Lies That May Be ProhibitedBecause of a
Strong Government Interest
The two-level theory of speech has substantially evolved in the
seventy-three years since Chaplinsky. Some of the categories of no
value speech the Court listed no longer count among the realm of the
unprotected. 42 The fighting words doctrine itself has been withered by
criticism and narrowed almost beyond recognition. 43 But the central
premise of the two-level theory is still intact-some types of speech have
no value under the First Amendment and may therefore be banned by
the government. Indeed, since Chaplinsky, the Court has expanded the
list of categories of unprotected speech to include true threats, 44 child
pornography, 45 and expression that violates copyright laws. 4 6
Several different categories of lies also have been held to, or are
assumed to, fall outside the First Amendment's protection because they
lack any social value and also cause tangible harms to third parties or
to society at large. Common law and statutory fraud provisions, which
regulate speech designed to induce listeners to give money to the
speaker under false pretenses, are well-accepted examples of speech
regulations the government may enforce without much constitutional
limitation. 47 In Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates,

42.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (striking down conviction for lewd
and profane language).
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1089 (6th ed. 2009):
43.
The Court has not upheld a conviction on the basis of the fighting words doctrine since
Chaplinsky. It has been argued that the Court's post-Chaplinsky decisions have so
narrowed the doctrine as to render it meaningless, and that the doctrine is "nothing
more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic
society dedicated to the principle of free expression."
(citing Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980)).
Moreover, the Court has managed to squeeze a third level into its historically binary model of
speech with certain categories of speech deemed to be entitled to some, but not full, constitutional
protection. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)) (incitement to unlawful activity); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 70 (1976) (non-obscene pornography); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (commercial speech).
44. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) ("What is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.").
45.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (discussing limits on child
pornography).
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1977)
46.
("Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first publication in
particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value.").
47.
Other types of fraudulent inducement unrelated to financial gain may also fall outside
of the free speech clause. For example, in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 333 (1920), the Court
rejected a First Amendment claim by a person charged with discouraging military enlistment in
part because his statements were deliberate misrepresentations.
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Inc.,48 the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge by a
professional charitable fundraising organization that was sued by the
state for making false and misleading misrepresentations to donors. 49
In doing so, it made it clear that "the First Amendment does not shield
fraud."5 0 Fraudulent speech has no First Amendment value and also
causes harm to its targets.5 1
Similarly, the government has unquestioned power to regulate
false statements of fact in the context of perjury. It borders on absurd
to argue that a person's lies under oath would advance any First
Amendment values, since such speech obscures, rather than leads to,
truth finding. Indeed, judicial proceedings are designed to smoke out
the truth and resolve disputes; lies that distort or impair the judicial
process are undoubtedly harmful to these goals. 52 Perjured testimony
can lead to harm to third parties (say, a wrongfully convicted criminal
defendant), to the justice system itself (by undermining its ability to
accurately resolve disputes), and in some cases may materially benefit
the speaker (by evading liability or conviction). 53 Not surprisingly, then,
the Court has repeatedly classified perjury as speech beyond the First
Amendment's protection. 54 The same could be said for laws that prohibit
or criminalize making false statements to government officials in the
course of their official duties.55

538 U.S. 600 (2003).
48.
Id. at 624.
49.
Id. at 612. Although fraud is generally not covered by the First Amendment, government
50.
regulations directed at fraud are not immune from scrutiny. The Court has, for example, frowned
upon broad, prior restraints aimed at preventing fraudulent speech, see Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939), and has also invalidated prophylactic measures automatically
categorizing certain types of charitable solicitations as fraudulent for fear of overreaching and
limiting charitable solicitation as speech, see Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781,
800 (1988); Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984); and
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
51.
In other areas in which the government regulates fraud, there is frequently not even a
discussion or consideration of First Amendment limitations because the issue is treated as selfevident. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 641-42 (2006)
(observing the many ways in which securities regulations affect speech yet are assumed to fall
outside of First Amendment scrutiny). See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1767 ("[W]hether the First
Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply assumed.").
52.
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) ("Perjured testimony 'is at war
with justice' because it can cause a court to render a 'judgment not resting on truth."') (citation
omitted).
See id.
53.
See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961).
54.
55.
The Federal False Statements Act is one example of such a law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2012); see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.
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Other forms of misrepresentation that compromise the integrity
of government processes also fall outside of the First Amendment, even
when the misrepresentation is not made under oath. For instance, when
a private citizen falsely represents that he or she is a police officer or
other government official, that statement is not protected speech.56 Like
the preceding examples, this type of speech has the effect not of
advancing democracy or facilitating the search for truth, but of
interfering with these goals. Speakers who engage in this conduct risk
undermining the integrity of government processes and potentially
misrepresenting or misappropriating the position and power of the
state.5 7 As the Court has explained, statutes criminalizing the
impersonation of public officials serve to avoid tangible harm to "the
general good repute and dignity of the (government) service itself."58
These lies almost always present a risk of injury to the public
reputation of the office or institution in question.5 9 In addition, because
government actors have the imprimatur of official authority,
misrepresenting oneself as having such authority presents special
dangers to third parties, who believe they are dealing with, and may
yield to, one who has the backing and authority of the State.60 It is for
this very reason that in civil rights litigation, actions under the color of
state authority are considered to pose a particular threat to individual
liberty.6 1 Consistent with the current law, we believe that
56.
See United States v. Swisher, 771 F.3d 514, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing the
deceptive dangers created by the impersonation of government officials); United States v. TomshaMiguel, 766 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[G]overnment has the constitutional power to
prohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employees."); United States v. Chappell, 691
F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing public safety as justification for the statute prohibiting such
impersonation).
57.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546. See also Norton, supra note 7, at 198 (observing that lying
about being a law enforcement officer harms "the public's trust in, and thus the effectiveness of,
law enforcement"). Of course, it is possible that in some instances impersonating a government
employee could serve the interests of truth and, on balance, benefit the goals of free speech.
58.
United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943).
59.
Id. We say almost always because perhaps it is conceivable that someone's drunken
braggadocio over a few beers does not cause harm. See Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate,
Misappropriate,and Acquire Governmental Power, in LAW AND LIES 167-68 (Austin D. Sarat ed.,
2015) ("Lies about being the government that constitute mere bragging or puffery, for example,
may be relatively harmless and thus undeserving of punishment."). For our part, we think that
even this sort of deception about being employed by the government may create risks of harm, but
we don't take up that question here.
60.
Norton, supra note 7, at 198.
61.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled on othergrounds by Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See generally Alan K. Chen, Rosy Picturesand Renegade
Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 918 (2010) (arguing that
Monroe "allowed suits against officials who violate constitutional rights while clothed, sometimes
quite literally, in judicial robes or police uniforms, giving them the imprimatur of the state's
power").
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impersonating a public official is a unique category of lying that, even
when done in an investigative context, falls outside the First
Amendment's scope.
Still another category of deception that is generally exempted
from First Amendment protection is commercial speech.6 2 At one time,
the Court categorically excluded commercial speech from First
Amendment coverage. 63 More recently, the Court has recognized that
commercial speech may have substantial value because it advances the
economic interests of the speaker and provides important information
to consumers and society at large. 64 But the Court has made it clear
that the government has wide latitude to regulate false or misleading
commercial speech. As it wrote in Central Hudson, "there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it."65 As with the preceding categories of lies that
are beyond the scope of constitutional protection, false or misleading
commercial speech is not valuable to the ends served by the First
Amendment and also has the potential to cause harm to those who are

misled by

it.66

C. Lies That Are Protected in Order to Avoid Chilling
(as Opposed to Generating) Truthful Speech
The Court strongly suggested in its Chaplinsky dicta that libel
has no First Amendment value because defamatory statements serve
no truth finding function and also cause harm to those whose
reputations are damaged by them.6 7 Since Chaplinsky, however, the
Court has developed a complicated, idiosyncratic set of First
Amendment rules for evaluating state defamation laws that provides
Commercial speech is "expression [that is] related solely to the economic interests of the
62.
speaker and its audience." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (distinguishing between truthful and deceptive commercial speech).
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruling recognized by Bose Corp. v.
63.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-64 (recognizing intermediate scrutiny as the proper
64.
standard of review for content-based restrictions on commercial speech); Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at
504 n.22 (discussing the history of the Court's treatment of commercial speech).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
65.
For further elaboration of categories of false factual statements that are not covered by
66.
the First Amendment, see Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3-11, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11210), 2011 WL 6179424, at *3-11.
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
67.
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robust protection for false statements directed at public officials and
public figures. 68 In the seminal case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the
Court reviewed a $500,000 judgment on a defamation claim brought by
a Montgomery, Alabama county commissioner against several civil
rights activists and a major newspaper.6 9 The newspaper had published
the activists' advertisement criticizing the local police, who were
ostensibly under the commissioner's direction, for engaging in
antagonistic conduct toward civil rights demonstrators. 70 It was
undisputed that some of the factual statements contained in the ad
were inaccurate.7 1 The trial judge had instructed the jury that these
types of statements constituted libel per se, meaning that the plaintiff
need not prove actual harm or malicious intent on the speakers' part in
order to recover damages. 72
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama courts'
rulings upholding the defamation verdict against the defendants. 73
Rejecting the claim that defamatory statements are categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court distinguished prior
cases addressing free speech and defamation because they did not
involve statements critical of public officials, observing that this dispute
must be evaluated "against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials." 74 In direct conflict with the language
in Chaplinsky, the Court stated that "libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations." 75
The Court recognized that in the context of criticism of
government officials or heated debate on important public issues,
speech would sometimes be exaggerated or even contain false
statements. 76 It went on to observe that "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms
of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to

68.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964) (imposing strict limitations
on libel claims brought by public officials); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)
(extending the New York Times standard to public figures).
69.
N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
70.
Id. at 257-58.
71.
Id. at 258.
72.
Id. at 262.
73.
Id. at 264.
74.
Id. at 270.
75.
Id. at 269.
76.
Id. at 271 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
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survive."'" The need to allow broad latitude for public discourse directly
shaped the scope of the applicable First Amendment protections.
The Court held that where defamation claims are brought by
public officials against speakers who criticize their conduct, those
claims may not be upheld unless the plaintiff can show that the
speaker's statement was made with "actual malice," meaning that the
speaker made the defamatory statement with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard for its falsity.7 8 In addition, the Court
held that in order to ensure that speech is not chilled, states must
require plaintiffs to prove the defendants' state of mind by clear and
convincing evidence.79 The point of imposing this high burden on public
official defamation plaintiffs was not that the false statements
themselves had intrinsic value, but that if critics of the government
were exposed to substantial tort liability, they might rein in their
rhetoric in ways that would result in self-censorship of even truthful
criticisms.8 0 Later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court applied
these same heightened protections to defendants accused of defamation
against any "public figures," "nonpublic persons who 'are nevertheless
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or,
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large."'81

Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted).
77.
Id. at 279-80.
78.
Id. at 285-86.
79.
Id. at 279. The Court did allow that false speech might actually play a role in public
80.
discourse to the extent that it might increase the chance that truthful counter-speech would
emerge in response. Id. at 279 n.19. The Court extended the New York Times standard to criminal
libel claims in Garrisonv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). The majority had
81.
characterized public figures as those who "commanded a substantial amount of independent public
interest at the time of the publications." Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (majority opinion). The opinion for
the Court articulated a slightly different standard, requiring that plaintiffs must show that the
speaker engaged in "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at
155. A majority of the Justices, however, endorsed extending the New York Times standard to
these cases, meaning that the plaintiff must show that the speaker knew that the allegedly
defamatory statements were false or showed reckless disregard for their truth. Id. at 162 (Warren,
C.J., concurring in result). This standard was contained in Chief Justice Warren's concurring
opinion, but later commanded the majority of the Court. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 336 (1974) (discussing the overlap in the Justices' multiple opinions in Butts). In Gertz,
however, the Court rejected extending the heightened proof standard to defamation claims brought
by private persons, even when the statements related to a highly publicized incident in which the
public had a great interest. Id. at 347. Even where private citizens are involved, however, the
Court said that the state may not impose liability for defamatory statements without imposing
some fault standard. Id.; cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760
(1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that defamation of private persons about matters of private
concern was not limited by the First Amendment).
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The Supreme Court has also extended the New York Times
standard to so-called "false light" invasion of privacy claims under state
tort law. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court reviewed a tort judgment
against a news magazine that had published an article and photo
spread connected to the opening of a fictional play loosely based on an
actual crime involving individuals who held a Pennsylvania family
hostage in their home.82 The family complained that the magazine story
represented the play as accurately depicting the actual crime, when in
fact the play had embellished and altered the story in significant
ways.88 The Supreme Court invalidated the jury's verdict for the family
on the ground that the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech
and press in the publication of material about matters of public
concern.84
As in the context of defamation, the Court's limitation of state
privacy torts was based not on the value of the false or inaccurate
statements in the article, but on the fear that zealous enforcement of
state law to police untrue statements would likely suppress a wide
range of speech, including truthful speech about matters of public
concern. 85 Such tort liability could create a chilling effect and "saddle
the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts
associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait,
particularly as related to nondefamatory matter." 86
Another context in which the Court has deemed false speech to
be constitutionally protected is in its assessment of the First
Amendment implications of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court
reviewed a tort judgment against a magazine that published a parody
in the form of a fake liquor advertisement implying that a nationally
known, politically active minister had lost his virginity to his mother in
an outhouse.87 The Court overturned a state court judgment that
imposed substantial civil liability on the magazine, holding that this
type of penalty for even an "outrageous" parody of a public figure cannot
withstand First Amendment scrutiny unless the plaintiff demonstrates
that there was a false statement of fact made with knowledge of its

385 U.S. 374, 377 (1967).
82.
83.
Id. at 378.
84.
Id. at 387-88 (limiting liability for state invasion of privacy torts to cases where the
plaintiff shows that the speech was undertaken with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard
for its truth).

85.

Id. at 388-89.

86.
87.

Id. at 389.
485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988).
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falsity or reckless disregard for the truth of the matter.8 8 Recognizing a
long history of parodies of public figures in political and other public
discourse, the Court concluded that the threat of tort liability could
create a chilling effect in the absence of a more restrictive standard. 89
As these cases illustrate, the Court's broad unequivocal
language that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact" does not tell the entire story.90 In reality, the Court has parsed out
false speech into different categories and distinguished them by their
nature and context, as well as by considering whether their protection
might be necessary to enhance the universe of speech available to the
public at large. But in each of these contexts, the Court's rationale for
protecting the statements as speech was to prevent the chilling of
truthful speech, not because it considered the false speech to have any
value.
D. The Beginning of a New Era:ProtectingLies That
Serve No Public Value
Prior to 2012, the Court's approach to First Amendment
protection for false statements of fact focused not on the value of the
speech, but on the concern that regulating false speech would also chill
truthful speech. In Alvarez, however, the Court struck down the Stolen
Valor Act, a federal statute that makes it a crime for anyone to "falsely
represent himself or herself, verbally or in writing to have been
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States."9 ' Alvarez, a local water board official, was
convicted of violating the Act when he boasted during a public meeting
that he had been awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor for his
military service. 92 The Court invalidated Alvarez's conviction, holding
93
that the Act violated the First Amendment right of free speech.
The lie at issue in Alvarez is little more than a valueless act of
self-promotion and impersonation, and the government had argued that
a variety of harms are suffered by the military community when its
honors are diluted in this way.9 4 Nonetheless, the Court held that

Id. at 56.
88.
Id. at 52-55. The Court also may well have been concerned that without a higher
89.
threshold of liability, public figure plaintiffs might circumvent the New York Times rule by
recasting their defamation claims as emotional distress actions.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
90.
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (plurality opinion).
91.
Id. at 2542.
92.
Id. at 2551.
93.
Id. at 2549.
94.
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Alvarez's lie was constitutionally protected. 95 Alvarez, then, reflects a
turning point: an intentional lie of little or no value, which arguably
caused some harm, was nonetheless deemed protected speech.
The decision was a fractured one, however, resulting in a legal
framework that remains uncertain. Justice Kennedy wrote for a four
Justice plurality, which declared that false speech is not categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment, and stated that strict scrutiny
should be applied to the Act, which it deemed to be a content-based
regulation of pure speech. 96 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan,
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, but argued that the Court
ought to apply intermediate scrutiny, balancing the law's threat to free
expression against the government's interest in regulating the speech. 97
Underlying the reasoning of all six Justices who supported the
judgment in Alvarez is the clear rejection of the proposition that lies are
entitled to "no protection at all" under the First Amendment. 98 In this
regard, there is a holding of the Court-a common denominator of
reasoning-that some lies are protected.9 9 Equally notable, Alvarez
departs from the two-level theory; the Court recognized that intentional
false statements were protected even though they lacked both intrinsic
and instrumental social value.1 00 Both the plurality and concurring
opinions regarded Alvarez's lies as nothing more than a valueless,
"pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded him,"101 yet they viewed
the lie as fully protected by the First Amendment.
That is not to say that Alvarez opens the floodgates to First
Amendment protection for all lies.10 2 The traditional categories of
95.
Id. at 2551.
96.
Id. at 2543-44.
97.
Id. at 2551-52 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
98.
Id. at 2553.
99.
Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment,
and PluralityOpinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 171 (2009) (explaining that "the D.C. Circuit [has]
held that a plurality decision rationale is only entitled to precedential weight if it is 'implicitly
approved by at least five Justices"' such that the holding reflects a common denominator of
reasoning) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir 1991) (en banc)).
100. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564 (Alito, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2542 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, however, did identify
circumstances in which lies might have some value. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment).
102. Professors Volokh and Weinstein argued in their amicus brief to the Court in Alvarez
that the Court ought to recognize a categorical exemption from constitutional protection for
knowing falsehoods, while allowing narrow exceptions for "statements about the government,
science, and history . . . in order to avoid an undue chilling effect on true factual statements,
statements of opinion, or other constitutionally valuable expression." Brief of Professors Eugene
Volokh and James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6179424, at *2. Their rationale for this
argument, however, is based primarily on a concern that allowing some protection for intentional
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unprotected lies that we discuss above-defamation of private persons,
fraud, false commercial speech, perjury, and impersonating
government officials-were all acknowledged as beyond the scope of the
First Amendment. 103 But, for the first time, the Court also recognized a
distinct set of lies that warranted protection, and the six Justices who
voted to invalidate the law fundamentally agreed on the limiting
principles that apply in this context. Both the plurality and concurring
decisions share the view that punishing "falsity alone" is not
permissible; instead, the government may only regulate false speech
when there is some "intent to injure," 104 or more precisely, some intent
to cause a "legally cognizable harm."1 0 5 Moreover, as the plurality
clearly explains, "[t]here must be a direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented." 0 6 Because it found
an insufficient link between lies about military awards and the dilution
of the public's perception of such honors, the Court rejected the
government's claim of harm. 107
While there are not yet a substantial number of cases applying
Alvarez, early indications are that lower courts are taking the Court's
cue and applying broad protections to lies. For example, two lower
federal courts recently invalidated state laws regulating false speech in
the context of political campaigns. In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson,
the Eighth Circuit struck down a Minnesota law making it a
misdemeanor for any person to intentionally participate in "the
preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or
campaign material . .. with respect to the effect of a ballot question,
that is designed or tends to . . . promote or defeat a ballot question, that
is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others
with reckless disregard of whether it is false." 0 8 While recognizing that
Alvarez did not render a majority opinion defining the appropriate
standard of review, the court held that the Minnesota law must be
subject to strict scrutiny because it regulated political speech based on
its content, and held that the law was unconstitutional because it was

lies might undermine the coherence of First Amendment doctrine and also lead to precedents that
would dilute the strict scrutiny standard because courts would be inclined to uphold many
government regulations of false statements of fact. Id.
103. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544-45.
104. Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 n.15 (N.D. Ala. 2013) ("[F]alsity
must be coupled with some other element of culpability, such as an intent to injure or defraud
another person.").
105. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.
106. Id. at 2549.
107. Id.
108. 766 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 2014).
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Supreme Court's

defamation cases, the appellate court invalidated the law because of its
potential to chill political speech, which often involves highly charged
110
statements that might be deemed by opponents to be "false."

Similarly, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Commission, a
federal district court issued a permanent injunction preventing the
11 1
To a substantial
state from enforcing its false campaign speech law.

degree, the court in this case used the same reasoning as the Eighth
Circuit in 281 Care Committee to hold that the Ohio law violated the
First Amendment. 112
Cases such as these illustrate the emergence of a distinct
jurisprudence of lying under the First Amendment. Prior to Alvarez, it
113
Of note,
is less likely that such statutes would have been invalidated.
provided
Alvarez
nor
cases
however, neither the false campaign speech
protection for the lies at issue because the lies had some intrinsic or
inherent political value. Quite the contrary. As the district court in
Susan B. Anthony List noted, the plaintiff, an anti-abortion advocacy
group, was not asserting a "right" to lie, but a right "not to have the
1 14
truth of our political statements judged by the Government."

III. A HISTORY OF HIGH VALUE LIES-INVESTIGATIVE DECEPTIONS
Lying is a complex behavioral phenomenon. In the abstract,
lying is typically viewed with almost universal moral opprobrium. But
this assumes that all lies are identical; in fact, context is critical to
5
evaluating whether lies are harmful.11 Recent studies suggest that
109. Id. at 784. The court did not actually determine whether the state's interest was
compelling. Id. at 787.
110. Id. at 793.
111. 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 770 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
112. Id. at 774-78 (utilizing strict scrutiny to invalidate Ohio's political false-statement laws
because of the chilling effect on protected political speech).
113. See, e.g., Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573, 575 (6th Cir. 1991) (upholding
a law prohibiting false statements during a political campaign). On the other hand, although it
was less likely, it was not altogether implausible that, even prior to Alvarez, lies made in an overtly
political context might have triggered strict First Amendment scrutiny. Our point is that in light
of Alvarez, the courts are more likely to find that lies in the political context or otherwise having
high value are constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.
2334, 2347 (2014) (recognizing that criminalizing lies about political candidates could "impose a
substantial hardship on" those who engage in political speech).
114. Susan B. Anthony List, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
115. In his opinion concurring with the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc in Alvarez,
then-Chief Judge Kozinski recognized the importance of context. As he wrote,
According to our dissenting colleagues, "non-satirical and non-theatrical[ ] knowingly
false statements of fact are always unprotected" by the First Amendment.... Not
"often," not "sometimes," but always. Not "ifthe government has an important interest"
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lying is common behavior, and in many contexts lying is not only not
forbidden, but also can serve socially useful functions. 116 As one
commentator recently reported, "We all tell lies, and tell them
shockingly often: Research shows that on average in an ordinary
conversation, people lie two to three times every 10 minutes."1 17 To be
sure, many lies that society seems to tolerate are relatively trivial and
socially acceptable, such as making a false statement to avoid hurting
someone's feelings.1 18 Lies are tolerated, and even encouraged, for the
purpose of gaining employment, so long as they are unrelated to one's
qualifications for the position."i 9 In public contexts, as Justice Breyer
observed in his Alvarez concurring opinion, lies "may stop a panic or
otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical,
philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as Socrates' methods
suggest) examination of a false statement (even if made deliberately to
mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize
the truth." 120
There is also a long tradition of using deception as a means of
gaining access to knowledge that would otherwise be obscured from
public view. Since at least the Industrial Revolution, lies have played a
central role in allowing the American public and the political branches
of government access to the closed-door goings on of certain industries.
From prisons, to mental hospitals, to schools, to the meatpacking
industry, lies have facilitated award-winning journalism, prompted

nor "if someone's harmed" nor "if it's made in public," but always. "Always" is a
deliciously dangerous word, often eaten with a side of crow.
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted).

116. Ulrich Boser, We're All Lying Liars: Why People Tell Lies, and Why White Lies Can Be

&

OK, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 18, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://health.usnews.com/healthnews/family-healthlbrain-and-behavior/articles/2009/05/18/were-all-lying-liars-why-people-telllies-and-why-white-lies-can-be-ok [http:// http://perma.cc/3JGR-2JVA] (citing Greg Willard

Richard H. Gramzow, Beyond Oversights, Lies, and Pies in the Sky: Exaggeration as Goal
Projection, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 477-92 (2009) (finding that
embellishments can create positive effects on future achievements)); see also Radiolab: Deception:
Lying to Ourselves, WNYC (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.radiolab.org/story/91618-lying-toourselves/ [http://perma.ccl7VR4-CC66] (discussing a study finding liars were happier and tended
to be better athletes).
117. Clancy Martin, Editorial, Good Lovers Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at SR4.
118. Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
119. One recent job advice website ran a story boldly titled "Why You Must Lie on Job

Interviews." Mark Stevens, Why You Must Lie On Job Interviews And What You Must Lie About,
LINKEDIN (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141006125226-10136502-why-youmust-lie-on-job-interviews-and-what-you-must-lie-about [http://perma.cc/6FUS-CH8X] (advising
job candidates to avoid completely being themselves, and instead "be what HR wants you to be").
120. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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changes in public behavior, and led to major legislative reforms.
Moreover, law enforcement has long engaged in investigative deception
to gain access to private information without obtaining a warrant, and
the Constitution has never stood as a barrier.121 But for investigative
deceptions, much information critical to public discourse would have
remained secret. This section explores the potential First Amendment
values of investigative deceptions by surveying several contexts in
which both law and society embrace the use of lies to investigate
wrongdoing.
A. Upton Sinclair and Lies
Perhaps the most iconic example of using deception to uncover
wrongdoing is Upton Sinclair's investigation of the Chicago
meatpacking industry, which became the source and inspiration for his
121. "[G]overnment agents may use deception to gain access to homes, offices, or other places
wherein illegal acts are being perpetrated. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the use of
trickery or deception to be permissible . . . ." Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
757 F.3d 1125, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014). Indeed, it has been acknowledged that "[i]f total honesty by
the police were to be constitutionally required, most undercover work would be effectively
thwarted. . . ." Id.; see also WAYNE LAFAVE ET. AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(c) (3d ed. 2000)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court's position is that
when an individual gives consent to another to intrude into an area or activity otherwise
protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware that he will thereby reveal to this other
person either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct, the consent is not vitiated
merely because it would not have been given but for the nondisclosure or affirmative
misrepresentation which made the consenting party unaware of the other person's
identity .... ).
But see People v. Jefferson, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam) (finding a
constitutional violation when police lied about an emergency gas leak in a house that threatened
health if not immediately inspected). Of course, lies that are so egregious as to be deemed coercive
are prohibited by the relevant criminal procedure doctrines. See Helen Norton, The Government's
Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 26-27),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574449 [http://perma.cc/XG42-NMFG] (compiling authority regarding
the scope of constitutionally permissible lies in the service of investigation); see also William J.
Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering,79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1907 (1993) (contending
that the guilty would benefit from a prohibition on lying by police but the innocent would actually
suffer under such a rule).
In any event, holding that the Constitution does not forbid lying by government agents is a far
cry from holding that lying is constitutionally protected. But to the extent the Constitution is
primarily a protection of citizens against the government, it is important to note how much
deception has been permitted by the government in the name of information gathering. See Chris
Hamby, Government Set Up A Fake FacebookPageIn This Woman's Name, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct.
6, 2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/government-says-federal-agents-canimpersonate-woman-online#.favGY5LgX [http://perma.cc/GG33-GQBL] (detailing a government
sting based on a false Facebook page using actual photos of an arrested person in an effort to gain
communication with her affiliates). It would be strange to suggest that the government has largely
unchecked abilities to lie to persons to obtain deeply private information, while private persons
are prohibited from engaging in limited deceptions in order to uncover non-intimate, business
details of political significance.
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path-breaking novel, The Jungle.122 To gather information for his work,
which he hoped would expose the many unfortunate ways in which
meatpacking companies treated their employees, 123 Sinclair gained
access to the facilities by disguising himself as a worker. "I would
wander about the yards, and my friends would risk their jobs to show
me what I wanted to see. I was not much better dressed than the
workers, and found that by the simple device of carrying a dinner pail I
could go anywhere." 24 One of his biographers reports that the clothes
and dinner pail were not quite enough, and that Sinclair gained access
"armed with a few simple lies appropriate to the area in which he was
investigating." 1 2 5 Whether by commission or omission, it is clear that
Sinclair gained access to the private workplaces of meatpacking plants
through deception. Moreover, to protect his cover, Sinclair could not
afford to be seen taking notes of his observations. Rather, he walked
through the meatpacking plant, "memorizing details of what he saw,
then rushing back to his room to write everything down."1 26
Like modern day animal rights and labor activists, Sinclair's
work was critical to revealing the unsavory practices of a wealthy and
powerful industry to public scrutiny. At the time he conducted his
investigation, livestock production was already the nation's largest
industry and was beginning to control a bigger part of the global
market.1 27 With all its resources, the industry was quite careful to
cultivate its public image. As one Sinclair biographer observed, "The
packers were wiser about public relations than most businessmen of
that era, arranging Potemkin village tours to carefully manicured parts
of their plants and advertising their own virtues lavishly . .. "128 Thus,
Sinclair's investigative deceptions were necessary to expose the truth
about the meatpacking industry's treatment of its employees to the
light of day. For more than a century, undercover investigations have
relied on lies to uncover politically important information otherwise
unavailable to forthright journalists. 2 9
122. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); see also ARTHUR WEINBERG & LILA WEINBERG,
THE MUCKRAKERS 205-06 (2001) (describing the process behind the novel's publication).
123. Although The Jungle would become more famous for exposing the unsanitary practices
of the meatpacking industry, it is undisputed that Sinclair's primary objective, driven by his
Socialist leanings, was to investigate and write about the plight of mistreated workers. LEON
HARRIS, UPTON SINCLAIR: AMERICAN REBEL 70-71 (1975).
124. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF UPTON SINCLAIR 109 (1962).

125. HARRIS, supra note 123, at 70 (emphasis added).
126. ANTHONY ARTHUR, RADICAL INNOCENT: UPTON SINCLAIR 49 (2006).

127. Id. at 45.
128. HARRIS, supra note 123, at 69.
129. Indeed, Sinclair was not alone in his investigative techniques. Numerous other
investigative journalists of this era, including Nellie Bly, Lincoln Steffens, and Ida Tarbell, used
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B. Undercover Journalism and Lies
Sinclair is characterized as one of the pioneers of "muckraking"
journalism. 130 Indeed, the history of modern journalism is filled with
examples of journalists employing a wide range of ethically
questionable tactics to secure information for their stories, and passing
that information on to the public. 131 These efforts have ranged from
simple omissions to outright lies.
For example, Ken Silverstein, an editor of Harper's Magazine,
set out to do a story on how much Washington lobbyists promise to their
foreign government clients. Silverstein represented himself as the head
of The Maldon Group, supposedly a collection of private investors who
were exporters of natural gas from Turkmenistan, which had a
government regime that he described as "Stalinist." 13 2 The purported
goal of hiring a lobbying firm was to show American policymakers that
the reforms being undertaken by the Turkmeni government were real,
which would help increase the chance of The Maldon Group's business
success. 133 To support his scheme, Silverstein took what he called
"minimal preparations." 13 4
I printed up some Maldon Group business cards, giving myself the name "Kenneth Case"
and giving the firm an address at a large office building in London, on Cavendish Square.
I purchased a cell phone with a London number. I had a website created for The Maldon
Group[-]just a home page with contact information[-]and an email account for myself.
Then, in mid-February, soon after Berdymukhamedov's ascent, I began contacting
various lobbying firms by email, introducing my firm and explaining that we were eager
to improve relations between the "newly-elected government of Turkmenistan" and the
United States. We required the services of a firm, I said, that could quickly enact a
"strategic communications" plan to help us. I hoped that the firms might be willing to
13 5
meet with me at the end of the month, during a trip I had planned to Washington.

The fiction worked like a charm, and Silverstein set meetings
with two powerful D.C. lobbying firms. As he described it in a later
opinion essay, what he found and reported was that:

&

the same methods to acquire information for their writings. See WEINBERG & WEINBERG, supra
note 122, at 431-32 (surveying the era of the "muckrakers"); see also, e.g., NELLIE BLY, TEN DAYS
IN A MAD-HOUSE 5-7 (CreateSpace Indep. Publ'g Platform 2011) (1887) (describing Bly's feigning
insanity to be admitted to an asylum to report on the treatment of patients).
130. For a definition and description of the origins of muckraking, see WEINBERG
WEINBERG, supranote 122, at xv-xvi.
131. See generally BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING: THE TRUTH ABOUT
DECEPTION (2012) (surveying the history of undercover reporting and arguing for its fundamental
journalistic value).
132. Ken Silverstein, Their Men in Washington: Undercover with D.C.'s Lobbyists for Hire,
HARPER'S BAZAAR, July 1, 2007, at 53, 2007 WLNR 26681127.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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In exchange for fees of up to $1.5 million a year, they offered to send congressional
delegations to Turkmenistan and write and plant opinion pieces in newspapers under the
names of academics and think-tank experts they would recruit. They even offered to set
up supposedly "independent" media events in Washington that would promote
Turkmenistan (the agenda and speakers would actually be determined by the lobbyists).
All this, [they] promised, could be done quietly and unobtrusively, because the law that
regulates foreign lobbyists is so flimsy that the firms would be required to reveal little
information in their public disclosure forms.136

Rather than being praised for exposing the unsavory underbelly
of foreign nationals' lobbying of the United States government,
Silverstein was taken to task by, of course, the targets of his
investigation, and by other journalists, for engaging in unethical
behavior. As one of his most vocal critics, Washington Post reporter
Howard Kurtz, wrote: "no matter how good the story, lying to get it
raises as many questions about journalists as their subjects."1 3 7
Another illustration of the value, but also the costs, of
undercover journalism is the investigation of the grocery store chain,
Food Lion, conducted by two reporters from the ABC News program
PrimeTime Live. The reporters used rsum6s with false identities,
addresses, and references to gain employment with two different Food
Lion stores. 138 After they were hired, they used hidden video cameras
to document and confirm what sources had initially reported to ABC
News, which was that Food Lion's food handling practices were highly
unsanitary and probably violated several laws. 139
The broadcast included, for example, videotape that appeared to show Food Lion
employees repackaging and redating fish that had passed the expiration date, grinding
expired beef with fresh beef, and applying barbeque sauce to chicken past its expiration
date in order to mask the smell and sell it as fresh in the gourmet food section. The
program included statements by former Food Lion employees alleging even more serious
40
mishandling of meat at Food Lion stores across several states.o

136. Ken Silverstein, Undercover, Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at 29, 2007 WLNR
12370843.
137. Howard Kurtz, Undercover Journalism, WASH. POST (June 25, 2007, 7:24 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2007/06/25/BL2007062500353.htm
[http://perma.cc/VX3Z-GV3T].
138. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
139. Id. at 510-11. See Opening Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., et al. at 27, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (Nos. 972492, 97-2564), 1998 WL 34097797 at *27 (disputing district court's "ironic conclusion that a
statute designed to prevent consumer deception can be used to punish ABC for uncovering the
consumer deception practiced by Food Lion").
140. 194 F.3d at 511. Food Lion won a jury verdict against the reporters and the news network
for fraud, breach of the duty of loyalty, and trespass, but the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld only
the duty of loyalty verdict, for which only nominal damages were awarded, and rejected Food Lion's
claims for damages related to the publication of the story and exposure of their food handling
practices. Id. at 524.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1460

[Vol. 68:6:1435

Another more subtle example is reporter Tony Horwitz's
investigation of poultry processing plants. Horwitz gained access to a
chicken-processing plant by getting hired as an employee so that he
could gather information for a story about the conditions of low-wage
workers.1 4 1 What Horwitz found was astonishing. Vastly underpaid
workers were given little to no training, placed in hazardous work
environments subject to minimal oversight by the plant, exposed to
unsanitary conditions, and subject to suspension for unexcused trips to
the bathroom. 142 These conditions imposed great health risks on
employees.1 43 Indeed, the type of work that poultry plant workers
engage in subjects them to four of the five highest risk factors for
cumulative trauma: "rapid and repetitive motion, awkward postures,
forceful motions, and no control over the pace of work."1 44
To gain access to the plant and personally observe the working
conditions, Horwitz applied for a position with a plant in Mississippi.1 45
Unlike the reporters in the prior examples, Horwitz's investigative
deception fell somewhere between an omission and an affirmative lie.
When he applied for employment, he used his real name and indicated
that he had a university education, but stated that his current employer
was "Dow Jones & Co.," the parent company of his actual employer.146
Horwitz, then, without telling an affirmative mistruth, concealed his
identity as a newspaper reporter. Notably, however, in the early 1990s
when this investigation took place, deception may not have even been
necessary in order for Horowitz to gain access to the poultry plant. The
industry had unusually high turnover rates, and "poultry companies
[would] hire constantly, with few questions asked and no skills
required."1 47 As Horwitz reported, the plant manager barely glanced at
his application before hiring him. 148 For his work on this story as the
centerpiece of a series about low wage workers, Horwitz was awarded
the Pulitzer Prize.1 49

141. Tony Horwitz, 9 to Nowhere: These Six Growth Jobs Are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes
Dangerous-TheyShow How '90s Trends Can Make Work Grimmer For Unskilled Workers-Blues
on the Chicken Line, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at Al, http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/ 5744
[http://perma.cc/D64Q-H2K3].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting ergonomics expert Barbara Silverstein from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

149.

Wall Street JournalReporters Horwitz and Suskind Each Win a Pulitzer Prize, WALL

ST. J., Apr. 19, 1995, at A2.

HIGH VALUE LIES

2015]

1461

One thing is not disputed about these or the multitude of other
successful undercover journalistic investigations conducted by
journalists: the truth of what they reported. As the court in the Food
Lion case clearly stated, "The truth of the PrimeTime Live broadcast
was not an issue in the litigation."15 0 Many other examples of similar
investigations have been documented. 15 1 To be sure, journalists and
journalism scholars have long debated the ethics of using lies and
deception in their reporting, but it is unquestionable that some of these
lies have led to exposure of a wide range of corruption, illegality, and
other information that is of great public concern. While some defend the
use of deception, and even affirmative lies, as rooted in the history of
investigative journalism and as an essential tool for uncovering the
hidden truth, others argue that journalists lose credibility when they
engage in deception, even if that leads them to uncover valuable
information. 1 5 2
C. Law Enforcement and Lies
Another context in which lying is a predominant investigative
tool is law enforcement. As with journalism, there is vigorous debate
about the morality of such practices. 153 But, there is also a very long
history of lying to suspects as part of criminal investigations. The
practice of deception has played a prominent role in some of the most
important criminal prosecutions in U.S. history, including that of
Jimmy Hoffa.1 54 And while the practice may attract scholarly and public
criticism, courts are virtually unanimous in singing the praises of
investigative deception. 15 5 As the Tenth Circuit recently explained in

150.

Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1999).

151.

UNDERCOVER

REPORTING:

DECEPTION

FOR

JOURNALISM'S

SAKE:

A

DATABASE,

http://dlib.nyu.edulundercover/undercover-journalism-debated
(last visited Sept. 1, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/43NS-DE8R].
152. See KROEGER, supra note 131, at 3-13 (discussing the variety, historical pedigree, and
contemporary relevance of undercover journalism); see also SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 221-23
(arguing that certain truth-enhancing institutions such as law enforcement bodies have a greater
duty to avoid lying even when such lies arguably achieve social benefits because they symbolically
serve special roles as beacons of truth).
153. See, e.g., Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of
Deceptive PoliceInterrogationPracticesin the United States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1029, 1033
(2009).
154. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966); see also United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 746-47 (1971); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932) (noting the
importance of deception to investigations).
155. For scholarly critiques, see, e.g., Elizabeth N. Jones, The Good and (Breaking) Bad of
Deceptive Police Practices,45 N.M. L. REV. 523, 529-30 (2015) (criticizing the use of investigative
deception through the lens of Breaking Bad); Khasin, supranote 153.
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defending the use of police deception, "[i]f total honesty by the police
were to be constitutionally required, most undercover work would be
effectively thwarted." 5 6 Echoing similar sentiments, one commentator
has observed, "As a society, we find living with the use of such deception
disconcerting, yet we dare not abandon such techniques."s7
Most notably, government officials routinely lie or misrepresent
their identities, as well as other factual information, in undercover
criminal investigations, or "stings."15 8 Typically, these operations
involve government agents posing as criminals or other actors affiliated
with criminal activity in order to investigate violations of law. Law
enforcement agents go undercover posing as drug dealers, prostitutes,
terrorist sympathizers, and various other participants in criminal
enterprises, to gather information that they would otherwise be unable
59
to access.1

Perhaps one of the best known examples of a government sting
is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Abscam" investigation.16 0 The
name Abscam was derived from Abdul Enterprises, a fake company set
up by the FBI to recover stolen art and securities.' 6 ' As the
investigation developed, it extended beyond its initial goals to pursue
charges of bribery of public officials.1 62 Of course, there are limits to the
government's use of deception. As with other investigative tactics,
government stings can cross the line from investigation to
entrapment,163 but the effectiveness of legitimate undercover
investigations is widely acknowledged.1 6 4

156. Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014).
157. Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media and Law Enforcement Use of Deception
as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 745, 746 (1999).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving an agent
"[p]osing as a semiretired contractor interested in hunting, fishing, and purchasing trophy big
game heads" who brought beer and participated in an illegal hunt in order to gain the evidence
necessary for an arrest based on violations of hunting related laws); see also GARY T. MARX,
UNDERCOVER:

POLICE

SURVEILLANCE

IN AMERICA

186-87

(1988)

(discussing

the control

mechanisms involved in undercover operations).
159. Bell, supranote 157, at 746.
160. Katie Lannigan, FBI Undercover 'Stings' CatchingPoliticiansRed-Handed, ALJAZEERA
AMERICA (October 30, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/ 30/fbiundercover-stingscatchingpoliticiansredhanded.html [http://perma.cc/2WKP-2UZU].
161. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
162. Id. at 1462.
163. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992) (determining that law
enforcement officials implanted the disposition to commit a crime in the mind of an otherwise lawabiding citizen).
164. See, e.g., Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional
Proposalsto Limit TargetingDiscretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75,
78 (1987).
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The Supreme Court has approved such deceptions under an
"assumption of risk" theory. 165 The idea is seductively simple-in
talking to other persons or inviting them into parts of your life, one
always assumes the risk that the person might turn out to be a reporter,
a cop, or some other form of false friend.1 66 One is free to choose one's
friends and companions, and free to choose what to share with them,
but if the trusted friend or colleague turns out not to have your best
interests in mind, you cannot complain that the deception caused you
harm. The deceiver's morality can be debated, but under longstanding
Fourth Amendment doctrine, the propriety of using the evidence to
prevent public harm or crimes is settled.167
D. Civil Rights Testing and Lies
A third area in which lying has been routinely and effectively
used to expose the truth about matters of public concern is federal
housing discrimination law. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA")
prohibits various forms of race, sex, religion, and national origin
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.168 As with other
violations of law, housing discrimination can be difficult to detect. This
is particularly true of racial steering, which is conduct through which
persons discourage potential buyers or renters from pursuing housing
165. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
166. In this way, the media, law enforcement, and any other deceptive person are assumed
to have an equal claim to the right to deceive an individual. Bell, supranote, 157, at 836.
167. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (describing a wrongdoer's belief or confidence in a deceiver as
"misplaced" and undeserving of Fourth Amendment protection). To be sure, the Court's recent
decision in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), has generated confusion and excitement
about the future of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, which seems to be
garnering favor among lower courts and commentators, bluntly says that it may be necessary to
abandon the third-party doctrine. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[It may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties."); see also Miriam H. Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and Workable
Rules: Justice Sotomayor Stakes Out the Middle Ground in United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J.
F.
393
(2014),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/secrecy-intimacy-and-workable-rules
[http://perma.ccl473P-QDRU] ("[O]ne should not be surprised if Justice Sotomayor's Jones
concurrence eventually attains the same recognition as Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz
commanded almost five decades ago.").
It is important to note that the concerns identified by the Justices and commentators with the
third-party doctrine have nothing to do with the longstanding rule regarding false friends, Hoffa,
385 U.S. at 302, and everything to do with the fact that we now live in a "digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). We acknowledge,
however, that the strength of our analogy to the third-party doctrine would need to be reassessed
should that doctrine be abandoned.
168. 42 U.S.C. §3604 (2012).
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opportunities on a discriminatory basis.1 69 A person who represents to
another person "because of race" or other protected category that "any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such

dwelling is in fact so available,"1 70 violates the FHA. A critical method
of identifying racial steering and enforcing the FHA has been the use of
"testers" by both government officials and private civil rights
organizations. 171
In the
context
of housing
discrimination
investigations, "'testers' are individuals who, without an intent to rent
or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the
purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices." 172 For
example, investigators will send a white tester and an African
American tester to the same person to inquire about buying or renting
a home. If that person informs the white tester that housing is
available, but tells the African American tester that it is not, an FHA
violation has occurred. 173
Simply put, testing necessarily involves lying. Testers
frequently provide false names, addresses, and other identifying

data. 174 They also submit manufactured information such as credit
ratings and employment information to housing sellers or landlords
that conveys that, other than their race, they are essentially
indistinguishable.175 Moreover, of course, the testers are all
intentionally lying about their desire to buy or rent the property in
question. Civil rights testing is based on social science methods that
require control over every variable except race as a method of proving
discrimination. 176 This is especially useful under the FHA, which is
violated by disparate treatment. 177
Fair housing testing has been approved by the Supreme Court,
which has not only recognized such testing as an established practice,
but held that groups who hire persons to conduct these undercover
investigations enjoy Article III standing to bring FHA claims in federal

169. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 367 n.1 (1982).
170. § 3604(d).
171. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 368 (describing the private use of discrimination
testers); United States v. Garden Home Mgmt. Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416 (D.N.J. 2001)
(describing the Department of Justice's use of testers).
172. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373.
173. Id. at 374.
174.

See MERRICK ROSSEIN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION

§

12:6

(Thomson Reuters West 2015).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (making housing-related discrimination unlawful if
performed on the basis of race).
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court.1 78 Congress, too, has expressly embraced testing.1 7 9 It established

the Fair Housing Initiatives Program ("FHIP") as a temporary measure
in 1987, and permanently in 1991.180 The FHIP authorizes the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to allocate funds to
private nonprofit housing enforcement organizations to investigate
violations of the FHA through testing.18 1 The Secretary is required to
establish guidelines for such testing to ensure that such activity
produces "credible and objective evidence of discriminatory housing
practices." 182 These guidelines place several limitations on who can be
testers,18 3 but do not, and by definition could not, prohibit testers from
engaging in deception and misrepresentation as part of their
investigations.1 84
There is evidence that testing has been effective in identifying
and rooting out housing discrimination. In 1996, the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission issued a report that testing as a result of FHIP grants
resulted in the identification of 136 possible FHA violations and the
filing of 41 complaints.18 5 A 1988 Urban Institute conference produced
several papers that identified the effectiveness of civil rights testing. As
stated in the executive summary, "[e]vidence of discrimination has
come from several sources, including analysis of aggregate employment,
housing, and other data sets. While the regression techniques employed
in these analyses have much to offer, they fail to provide the clear, direct
measures and narrative power offered by paired testing." 186 While
testing through intentional lies originated in the context of fair housing,

178. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379.
179. In addition to the FHA, the False Claims Act (FCA) reflects the congressional
endorsement of undercover investigations, often predicated on deception. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
The FCA provides for individuals who reveal fraud against the federal government to receive
sizeable awards. Id. § 3730(d). Notably, empirical data reveals that an increasing share of the FCA
actions are brought by private investigators-that is, persons who gain employment or access
through deception. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessingthe Private Attorney General: Evidence
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1278-80 (2012).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (2012).
181. § 3616a(b)(2)(A).
182. § 3616a(f)(2).
183. For example, testers under FHIP may not have prior felony convictions or convictions of
any crimes involving fraud or perjury. 24 C.F.R. § 125.107 (2015).
184. § 3616a(b)(2)(A) (2012).
185.

See

1996

IOWA

CIVIL

RIGHTS

COMMISSION

ANNUAL

REPORT:

TESTING,

http://publications.iowa.gov/1555/1/annualtesting.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
SVN2-8EBH]; see also Kathryn Lodato, et al., Investigatory Testing as a Tool for Enforcing Civil
Rights Statutes: Current Status and Issues for the Future, PUBLIC LAw RESEARCH INSTITUTE 5
(2004), http://gov.uchastings.edulpublic-law/docs/plriltesting.pdf [http://perma.cc/SF78-YNG4].
186. THE URBAN INST., A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE

OF TESTING 1 (Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1998).
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it is now used to investigate discrimination in other contexts, including,
18 7
among other things, disability discrimination.
E. Animal Rights Investigators, Lying, and Ag Gag Laws
Following the path of muckrakers, investigative journalists, law
enforcement officials, and civil rights testers, animal rights activists,
scholars, and journalists in recent years have been conducting their
own undercover investigations of the agricultural industry to expose
unlawful and unethical mistreatment of animals. And they have been
extraordinarily effective. In a gripping account of the modern industrial
production of meat, political scientist Timothy Pachirat published a
book vividly describing his undercover investigation of a Nebraska
slaughterhouse.18 8 The book, Every Twelve Seconds, provides an
insider's view of what it is like to work in a facility that kills one cow
18 9 Likewise, awardevery twelve seconds, or 2,400 animals per day.
winning journalist Ted Conover did an undercover investigation in 2013
and wrote a graphic article in Harper's Magazine titled The Way of the
Flesh.190 These are but two examples of a body of investigative work
that has considerable political import.
Perhaps no undercover investigations in the agricultural field
this century, however, have been more powerful than those produced
by animal welfare organizations. In 2008, for example, the Humane
Society of the United States released video footage from the Hallmark

187. Kelly Johnson, Note, Testers Standing Up for Title III of the ADA, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 683, 685 (2009); see also Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title VII: A
Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1992) (employment discrimination
testers). Yet another context in which lying might serve important instrumental value is in
advancing academic research. See Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: InstitutionalReview
Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 323 (2004) (arguing that researchers conducting verbal research
(e.g., interviews) sometimes engage in deceit to facilitate access to their research subjects).
Government regulation of lying in such situations might raise First Amendment concerns. Id. at
322-24. But see generally James Weinstein, The Dimensions of ConstitutionalAnalysis: A Reply to
Professor Hamburger, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 569 (2007) (critiquing Hamburger's analysis). The
potential value of lying in academic research is reflected by a recent academic study in which
researchers used fake cover letters submitted to the accounting industry and "found that
employers expressed interest in candidates who disclosed a disability about 26 percent less
frequently than in candidates who did not." Noam Scheiber, Fake Cover Letters Expose
2015),
2,
(Nov.
UPSHOT
THE
TIMES:
Discrimination Against Disabled, N.Y.
2
015/11/02/upshot/fake-cover-letters-expose-discrimination-againsthttp://www.nytimes.com/
disabled.html [http://perma.cc/QWD7-6ADP].
188. See generally PACHIRAT, supra note 12.
189. Id. at 9.
190. See generally Ted Conover, The Way of All Flesh: Undercover in an Industrial
Slaughterhouse, HARPER'S MAG., May 2013, at 31, http:/Iharpers.org/archive/2013/05/the-way-ofall-flesh/ [http://perma.cclZPJ8-CURD].
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slaughterhouse in Chino, California that showed workers "kicking
cows, ramming them with the blades of a forklift, jabbing them in the
eyes, applying painful electrical shocks, and even torturing them with
a hose and water in attempts to force sick or injured animals to walk to
slaughter." 191 The footage was so compelling that it resulted in criminal
charges against a slaughterhouse manager,1 92 the largest beef recall in
United States history,1 93 a $500 million False Claims Act judgment, 194
and state legislation mandating better treatment of injured animals.1 95
It is hard to imagine a lie-the deceptions by the Humane
Society investigator in obtaining and performing his job-that could
have resulted in more positive or dramatic social and political
consequences. 96 To be sure, not every journalistic or activist
investigation of an agricultural facility has such striking or clearly
traceable results. But the numerous investigations over the past couple
of decades are all important in informing the contemporary political
debate about agricultural production. These expos6s have played a
material role in shaping the debate about animals as food in the United
States.197 These investigations are one of the most effective tools in
convincing persons to reduce or eliminate animal products from their

191. Rampant Animal Cruelty at California Slaughter Plant, HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE U.S.
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/news/2008/01/undercover-investigation
013008.html [http://perma.cc/BTG4-7W3L].
192. Victoria Kim, Charges of Meat Plant Cruelty Filed, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2008),
http://articles.1atimes.com/2008/feb/16/locallme-beefl6 [http://perma.cc/3PBZ-QDJ3].
193. David Brown, USDA Orders Largest Meat Recall in U.S. History, WASH. POST (Feb. 18,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/17/
AR2008021701530.html [http://perma.cc/GE8H-FRCF].
194. Linda Chiem, SlaughterhouseOwners Hit With $500M Judgment in FCA Case, LAw360
(Nov. 16, 2012, 9:35 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/394827/slaughterhouse-owners-hitwith-500m-judgment-in-fca-case [http://perma.cc/UUD5-YNEJ].
195. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969 (2012) ("[T]he video also prompted the
California legislature to strengthen a pre-existing statute governing the treatment of
nonambulatory animals."). But see id. at 969-70 (nullifying the California law as preempted by
federal law).
196. One commentator has observed that the greatest protection for news gathering must
apply when the matters investigated are "of the most serious public concern," and explained that
"[s]uch matters would include felonies, corruption of public officials, dangers to our democratic
institutions, and activities that imperil the public health and safety." Andrew B. Sims, Food for
the Lions: Excessive Damages for Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of Current First
Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 537 (1998). Agricultural investigations implicate all of
these concerns.
197. Andrew Cohen, The Law That Makes It Illegal to Report on Animal Cruelty, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/the-law-thatmakes-it-illegal-to-report-on-animal-cruelty/284485/
[http://perma.cclVBQ6-GP6Y];
Peter
Moskowitz, Idaho Gov. Signs 'Ag Gag' Bill Into Law, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 28, 2014 5:06 PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/28/idaho-gov-signs-aggagbillintolaw.html
[http://perma.cclL9MV-Z9SP].
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diet. 198 Likewise, industry researchers have recently concluded that the
work of these investigative groups is emerging as the "primary
information source" about animal welfare for consumers. 199 To the
extent that the First Amendment is animated by the goals of facilitating
democratic self-governance and the broader search for truth, these
activities clearly advance those objectives.
Notably, as in other fields, there is no viable alternative to an
undercover investigation of the commercial agricultural industry.
Activists and journalists who are transparent about their investigative
objectives are likely to be subject to the same Potemkin village effect as
Sinclair confronted in his time. 20 0 Public relations campaigns by the
industry tell only one side of the story. Organized farm tours and
carefully chaperoned visits will not produce the same accurate images
or truthful information that has become the centerpiece of the American
debate on farmed animal welfare. The same barriers to investigation
are likely to emerge in other areas of social concern. For example, an
officially sanctioned, scheduled tour of an abusive child care facility or
nursing home will not likely reveal to the reporter any abuse or neglect.
Just as Upton Sinclair's work led to federal law reforms, recent
agricultural industry investigations have resulted in food recalls,
enactment of state laws, and criminal prosecutions. 201 In response to
the prominence and efficacy of these investigations and their public
exposure of the unsavory and sometimes unlawful practices of
commercial agricultural operations, the agricultural industry has
sought to enact laws that would make these investigations impossible.
These Ag Gag laws criminalize undercover investigations by
journalists, researchers, or investigators.

198. See Nadine Watters, 16 Million People in the US are Now Vegan or Vegetarian!,
http://news.therawfoodworld.com/16-million-people-us-now-veganTHERAwFOODWORLD.COM,
vegetarian [http://perma.cc/T9FW-PJ8S] ("Sixty-nine percent said they chose to eat a vegan diet
to support the ethical treatment of animals.").
199. M.G.S. McKendree et al., Effects of Demographic Factorsand Information Sources on
United States Consumer Perceptions of Animal Welfare, 92 J. ANIMAL Scl., Nov. 2014, at 3161,
3161.
200. See HARRIS, supra note 123, at 69 ("The packers were wiser about public relations than
most businessmen of that era, arranging Potemkin village tours to carefully manicured parts of
their plants and advertising their own virtues.").
201. See, e.g., supra notes 188-199.
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Since 2012, more than twenty-five states have introduced Ag
Gag bills, 202 and eight such bills have been enacted into law. 20 3 A critical
feature of most of these laws is the criminalization of all access to
agricultural sites based on deception, misrepresentations, or false
pretenses. 204 The laws tend to target gaining employment for
investigative purposes specifically, and all misrepresentations to gain
access more generally. 205 For example, Utah's Ag Gag law criminalizes
"obtain[ing] access to an agricultural operation under false pretenses"
or obtaining employment for purposes of obtaining recordings of sounds
or images. 206 The Idaho version makes it a crime to "enter[ ] an
agricultural production facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass; . . . [or] obtain[ ] employment with an agricultural production
202. The first Ag Gag laws were passed back in 1990 and 1991, in Kansas, Montana and
North Dakota. However, these laws primarily targeted those who were trespassing to acquire
footage at agricultural facilities and did not criminalize much, if any, conduct that was not already
forbidden by general trespass laws. Similarly, in 2002 the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
("AETA"), drafted by the conservative advocacy group, the American Legislative Exchange Council
("ALEC"), was rushed through Congress without debate. WILL POTTER, GREEN IS THE NEW RED:
AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNDER SIEGE 170-73 (2011). The AETA made it a
felony to "[e]nter an animal or research facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera, or
other means with the intent to commit criminal activities or defame the facility or its owner." Id.
at 128. It has been reported that ALEC is also heavily involved in the drafting of model Ag Gag
legislation. Will Potter, 'Ag Gag" Bills and Supporters Have Close Ties to ALEC, GREEN IS THE
NEW RED (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.greenisthenewred.comlblog/ag-gag-american-legislativeexchange-council/5947/ [http://perma.cclD73U-SZBKI.
203. The States with Ag Gag laws as of September 2015 are Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Utah,
Montana, Kansas, North Dakota, and North Carolina. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825 to -1830 (West 2015); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 578.013 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-30-101 to -105 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §§ 12.1-21.1-01 to -05 (West 2015); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2015); An Act to Protect
Property Owners From Damages Resulting From Individuals Acting in Excess of the Scope of
Permissible Access and Conduct Granted to Them, H.R. 405, 2015 Sess. (N.C. 2015),
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BilLookUp.pl?Session=2015&BillID=h405
[http://perma.cc/BD3B-26DW]; see also Sarah R. Haag, Note, FDA Industry Guidance Targeting
Antibiotics Used in Livestock Will Not Result in Judicious Use or Reduction in Antibiotic-Resistant
Bacteria,26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318 (2015) (listing eight states with Ag Gag provisions);
Sarah Evelynn, Does Ag-Gag Make You Gag?, BILL TRACK 50 (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.billtrack50.com/blog/civil-rights/does-ag-gag-make-you-gag/
[http://perma.edSQ4FKENB] (listing five states that passed Ag Gag bills).
204. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b). One
state, Missouri, criminalizes the failure to immediately report observed abuse. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 578.013 ("Whenever any farm animal professional videotapes or otherwise makes a digital
recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm animal subjected to abuse or neglect .. . such
farm professional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital recording to a law
enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the recording."). By requiring immediate
disclosure, this law effectively criminalizes long-term investigations that would show a pattern or
practice of abuse, and also implicates constitutional concerns. For present purposes, however, we
set the Missouri statute to one side because it does not directly regulate lies.
205. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b)-(c).
206. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2).

1470

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:6:1435

facility by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause
economic or other injury." 207
These laws go beyond generally applicable trespass laws, and
instead specifically target those who wish to gain access to agricultural
facilities. They also extend well beyond laws prohibiting fraud,
invasions of privacy, or physical damage, insofar as the criminalized
conduct need not produce any injury other than the exposure of illegal
or otherwise abhorrent practices through an undercover recording or a
written account of what was observed. 208 In other words, Ag Gag laws
criminalize lies even when they do not directly cause any injury at all,
but rather expose the practices or illegal acts of a massive, federally
subsidized, politically powerful industry. All Ag Gag laws except North
Carolina's authorize some form of criminal punishment for violators,
including prison time, fines, and restitution. 209
Moreover, the legislative purpose behind these laws is much
clearer than the typical criminal statute. The legislative history, the
effect of the laws, and the context, 2 10 all evince a legislative desire to
target animal rights activists and sympathetic journalists and subject
their political speech to disfavored treatment. 211 Illustrative are the
comments from the executive director of the trade group that drafted
the Idaho Ag Gag bill: "This impacts our industry. So, you have to look
and say, you know, you don't stand up on a soapbox and broadcast." 212
Similarly, an Idaho state representative spoke in favor of that law by
207. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c). Some laws establish a separate criminal offense
for the actual conduct of making a nonconsensual audio or video recording on the premises of an
agricultural operation. § 18-7042(1)(d). The constitutional protections applicable to image and
sound capture in a nonpublic forum raise distinct questions that we address in a subsequent
article. See Marceau & Chen, supra note 14 (discussing video recording regulations in relation to
First Amendment rights). There are pending lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the Utah
and Idaho Ag Gag laws. The authors disclose that they serve as plaintiffs' counsel in both of these
cases.
208. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1) (establishing that mere presence on an
agricultural facility is enough for criminal punishment); IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (same).
209. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(3); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 717A.3A, 903.1; MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 558.011(1)(5), 578.013(3); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-21-50, -80 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6112(3)-(4), -3-204(1)-(2).
210. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 nn.1617, 268 n.18 (1977) (explaining that the historical background and surrounding circumstances of
state action play a role in determining whether the state action has a discriminatory purpose).
211. See, e.g., Bollard, supra note 9, at 10965-66 (revealing the legislative intent of Iowa and
Utah to stop the "extremist vegans" and "national propaganda groups" from destroying the
agricultural industry). Importantly, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that under the
First Amendment, "strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when
the purpose and justification for the law are content based." Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2228 (2015).
212. Idaho Senate Agric. Affairs Comm. Transcripts (Feb. 20, 2014), at 75:10 (statement of
Bob Naerebout, Exec. Dir., Idaho Dairyman's Ass'n) (emphasis added) (on file with authors).
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explaining that "[bly releasing the footage to the Internet, with
petitions calling for a boycott of products of any company that bought
meat or milk from Bettencourt Dairy, the organizations involved then
crossed the ethical line for me." 2 1 3 As a federal district court recently
held, the Idaho legislature's desire to shield an industry from public
scrutiny of the most damaging kind-exposure by whistleblowers-is
explicit in the legislative record. 214

In short, deception has a long and storied, if controversial, role
in American history. "[O]ur most cherished image of the press is the
fearless reporter who uncovers matters we would prefer not to see or
think about." 2 15 And while there may be instances where deception used
to facilitate access to private information goes too far towards violating
privacy, many undercover investigations seek information that cannot
be fairly "consider[ed] private," such as
[t]he restaurant critic who pretends to be a regular customer, the journalist who pretends
to be a taxicab fare and records his interaction with the cab driver, the housing tester who
pretends to need a dwelling and records his interaction with a realtor, or even the
television producer who obtains a job at a food processing plant and records food-handling
216
practices she observes.

As we explain in the remainder of this Article, when the information
revealed through the use of deception relates to a matter of great
political significance or public debate, and the information revealed is
not of an intimate personal nature, the deceptions used to gain such
information should enjoy protected status under the First Amendment.
IV. SPEECH THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE OF
INVESTIGATIVE DECEPTIONS

As we have already shown, the Court has recognized the
necessity of protecting lies under the First Amendment, but historically
it has done so only when necessary as a prophylactic protection to avoid

213. Donna Pence, Pence Legislative 2014 Update Week 7, DONNA PENCE: LEGISLATIVE
UPDATES & NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014), https://representativepence.wordpress.com/2014/02/21/pencelegislative-2014-update-week-7/ [http://perma.cc/K4BB-F9GS].
214. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943, at *8 (D.
Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) ("[A] review of § 18-7042's legislative history leads to the inevitable conclusion
that the law's primary purpose is to protect agricultural facility owners by, in effect, suppressing
speech critical of animal-agriculture practices.").
215. Bell, supra note 157, at 837.
216. Id. at 750.
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chilling truthful speech. 2 17 Even after Alvarez, the Court has never
explicitly distanced itself from the longstanding view that "[u] ntruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake." 2 1 8 That is, it has never considered that false factual speech might
in some contexts actually have either intrinsic or instrumental social
value. This approach has considerable intuitive appeal. Deliberate
misrepresentations would seem to be completely at odds with
advancing democratic self-governance or the broader "truth-seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas" that are often cited as central
objectives of the First Amendment. 2 19 Indeed, it is not at all clear that
even investigative lies have intrinsic value. That is, such deceptions do
not directly contribute to discourse, but are a tool to gather information
that informs that discourse. The lie itself, so the argument would go, is
not directly serving any truth or democracy enhancing purposes. It is
certainly true that the lies like, "I hate PETA and I am not affiliated
with any animal rights organization" or "I love eating bacon and I have
no problem with killing animals" do not directly contribute to a debate
of public importance in the same manner as, for example, "Meat Is
Murder,"220 might.
In this Part, we offer a novel view of the intersection of the First
Amendment and lying by arguing that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, lies by journalists, law enforcement officers, other
investigators, and political activists made for purposes of exposing
illegality or other private conduct that involves matters of important
public concern fundamentally advance the First Amendment's values,
and therefore have particularly strong instrumental value. 221 Even if
investigative deceptions do not directly influence public discourse, the
courts have routinely protected other types of speech and even conduct

217. As the Alvarez plurality explained:
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to
sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a
material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power unprecedented
in this Court's cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the
exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free
speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547-48 (2012).
218. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (emphasis added); see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (explaining that such a view of false
speech in prior cases arose in the context of "defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable
harm associated with a false statement"). The opinions in Alvarez, particularly Justice Breyer's
concurrence, acknowledge that some falsehoods might in some contexts have value. Id. at 2553
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
219. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
220. THE SMITHS, Meat Is Murder, on MEAT IS MURDER (Rough Trade Records 1985).
221. See Norton, supra note 7, at 164 ("Some lies have instrumental or even moral value.").
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that is not itself expressive in the conventional sense, but is preparatory
to speech. As the Court observed in Citizens United v. FEC, "[l]aws
enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in
the speech process."2 22 Indeed, the Court's campaign finance cases are
all to some degree predicated on the notion that restrictions on
fundraising and spending are limited by the First Amendment because
they facilitate subsequent political speech. 223 Similarly, investigative
lies may be understood as speech that is a necessary precursor to public
debate about important political, social, and moral issues.
Most contemporary free speech theory is grounded in
instrumental
justifications
for
constitutional
protection
of
224
expression,
and lies of the sort we have discussed in the previous
section-investigative
deceptions-actually
serve these values
underlying the First Amendment. High value lies promote the three
primary theoretical purposes of the First Amendment: democracy,
truth-facilitation, and self-fulfillment. We develop these arguments in
detail in the following discussion.
A. Investigative DeceptionsPromote Democratic Self-Governance
One of the dominant speech theories argues that expression
must be protected to ensure the advancement of democratic selfgovernment. As one of its most prominent proponents has written, "The
primary purpose of the First Amendment is . .. that all the citizens
shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our
common life." 2 25 Meaningful deliberation about such issues can only
take place with free and open discourse. More recently, Robert Post has

.

222. 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010).
223. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("A restriction on the amount of money
a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."). For the same reason, Ag Gag laws that directly
restrict nonconsensual investigative video recordings also implicate First Amendment speech
concerns. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1023 (D. Idaho 2014); see also
ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that "[t]he act of making an audio or
audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech
and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording"). We will discuss
this in greater detail in a forthcoming article. See Marceau & Chen, supra note 14 (discussing video
recording regulations in relation to First Amendment rights).
224. Other scholars reject instrumentalist theories of speech and argue instead that the
freedom of expression can best be understood by focusing on the government's reasons for
regulation. Larry Alexander argues that "[fjreedom of expression is implicated whenever an
activity is suppressed or penalized for the purpose of preventing a message from being received."
ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 9; see also Koppelman, supra note 23, at 722 ("Government
regulation of speech is truth advancing in some contexts and not others . .
225. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 88-89.
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observed that the democracy-based theory of speech requires protection
of the process of forming public opinion. 226 On this view, the First
Amendment ought to protect "those speech acts and media of
communication that are socially regarded as necessary and proper
means of participating in the formation of public opinion," which he
calls "public discourse." 227 "The function of public discourse," he writes,
"is to enable persons to experience the value of self-government." 228
Both its strength and weakness as a First Amendment theory is
the fact that self-governance is a justification for protecting only speech
that is at least somewhat related to public affairs, either in the context
of electoral politics or public policy debates. While some types of
expression are more difficult to defend on democracy grounds, 229
investigative deceptions are directly connected to the advancement of
self-governance. After all, as we have described, some of the most
famous and award winning journalism is predicated on an investigative
deception that led to access to a commercial, governmental, or other
non-intimate enterprise. Deception and lies can effectively uncover
criminal conduct, enhance transparency in government, expose race
discrimination, and reveal animal abuse, among many other types of
illegal conduct. 230 These are all matters of public concern, and
enhancing citizen scrutiny of them advances public discourse and
democracy in meaningful ways. Thus, investigative deceptions seem
well-anchored in the promotion of self-governance.
Accordingly, limits on such "lies of access" run afoul of the
principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited [and]
robust,"231 and, more generally, undermine democratic self-governance.
As Dean Post has observed, "[tlhe difficulty is that government control
over factual truth is in tension with the value of democratic
legitimation." 232 For example, exposing unsavory behavior by private
Washington lobbyistS 2 33 and uncovering racial steering in the housing

226. Robert Post, ParticipatoryDemocracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, InstrumentalMusic and the FirstAmendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
381, 385 (2015).
230. See generally KROEGER, supra note 131 (analyzing ethical debates surrounding
journalists' use of deception and asserting the public service provided by such reporting should be
celebrated).
231. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (recognizing a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
232. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 29 (2012).

233.

See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
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market 234 both clearly contribute to citizen self-governance in critical
ways. Similarly, investigative deceptions in the agricultural context,
like the sort of misrepresentations criminalized by Ag Gag statutes,
promote democracy. Animal welfare has become an important national
public policy issue. Investigations in this field regularly result in front
page stories in major newspapers, televised investigative reports, and
animal welfare bills introduced and debated at the federal, state, and
local level. 235 The impact of Ag Gag laws in criminalizing investigative
deceptions is to shield from public scrutiny matters that are
indisputably of public concern because they directly inform discussion
and debate on this important issue. Food safety, environmental, labor,
and animal welfare issues that arise in a massively subsidized industry
must fall near the top of any list of politically significant issues.236
B. Investigative Deceptions Promote the Broader Search for Truth
Under another understanding, protection of speech from state
interference is necessary to advance the search for "truth," which is
defined as broader than political truth and extending to a more general
theory of social enlightenment. 237 The notion of truth under this theory
emphasizes the truth of ideas, rather than factual truths. A key notion
here, and one that is often drawn upon in judicial decisions about
speech, is that there is no such thing as a false idea, and that truth can
ultimately only emerge through robust, open discourse in the so-called
marketplace of ideas.238
Even beyond the legal and public policy questions that are
placed into issue when expos6s of the agricultural industry are
conducted, undercover agricultural investigations inform significant
moral and philosophical questions relevant to the broader search for
234.

See supra notes 168-187 and accompanying text.

235. See, e.g., Michael Moss, In Quest for More Meat Profits, U.S. Lab Lets Animals Suffer,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2015, at Al; Stephanie Strom & Sabrina Tavernise, Animal Rights Group's
Video of Hens Raises Questions, but Not Just for Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2015, at B3.
236. Sims, supra note 196, at 537; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) ("[T]he lies used to facilitate
undercover investigations actually advance core First Amendment values by exposing misconduct
to the public eye and facilitating dialogue on issues of considerable public interest.").
237. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-92 (Yale University Press, 2003) (1859); JOHN
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 4-5 (1644); see also Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of

Ideas/Searchfor Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 596-98 (2011)
(arguing that government regulation of ideas in the marketplace would lessen the public's belief
in the idea because contrary ideas challenging thoughts is how we decide what is truthful or not).
238. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.").
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truth protected by the First Amendment. For example, while some
might believe that agricultural animals are merely unfeeling,
unthinking forms of property, like tractors or barns, others believe that
any use or exploitation of animals for human gain is immoral. 239
While there is certainly an overlap between this moral discourse

and the public policy debates on related issues, the search for truth in
the sense of social enlightenment is also advanced by the information
produced by investigative deceptions. Again, to take agricultural
investigations as an example, such lies serve to expose the hidden
conduct of commercial agricultural operations. These revelations may
affect the public's thinking about the morality of modern agricultural
practices. While an investigator cannot control the message that her
videos convey, one can be sure that she is prompting the kind of
reflection that shapes public opinion. 240 Certainly the same could be
said about investigations in other fields. Thus, under the truth serving
theories of the First Amendment, investigative deceptions may be

powerfully justified. 241

239.

See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS AS PERSONS: ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITION OF

ANIMAL EXPLOITATION 3-21 (2008) (arguing that how humanity treats nonhumans does not
matter in the debate for animal rights because the more salient issue is that humanity treats
nonhumans as property in the first place); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE

CLASSIC OF THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT 94 (First Harper Perennial ed. 2009) (advocating the end of
"all exploitation of sentient animals").
240. ASPCA Research Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Investigations to Expose
Animal Abuse on IndustrialFarms, ASPCA (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.aspca.org/about-us/pressreleases/aspca-research-shows-americans-overwhelmingly-support-investigations-expose
[http://perma.cc/L6BS-UXNL].
241. We distinguish this argument from claims that lies may be morally necessary not
because they lead to truth, but because they advance morality at either the individual or societal
level. See, e.g., Varat, supra note 7, at 1122 (examining "whether the First Amendment might
impose limits on the imposition of . .. liability for lies used to secure publishable information that
is both true and potentially of great public importance"); Wright, supra note 7, at 1143-44 (arguing
that people lying with reasonable frequency has yet to sabotage human verbal communication).
Moreover, lies may even enhance society's ability to deliberate about truth over the long run.
As Wright observes:
Unquestionably, to lie to anyone, including an interrogating slave hunter or Nazi officer
is, ordinarily, to fail to further the interrogator's true understanding of where his
innocent quarry may be found. But on the other hand, such a lie (at least where
successful), may over time promote the moral truths of the real consequences of
slavery-ethnic and religious extermination, and genocide. Also to be factored in are
such truths that the liar, the liar's family, and the sheltered slaves or Jews might later
have discovered and perhaps shared. To obstruct the social systems of chattel slavery
or Nazism, insofar as either amounts distinctively to a truth-suppressive institution,
furthers the promotion of the truth.
Wright, supranote 7, at 1157-58.
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C. Investigative Deceptions Promote IndividualAutonomy
The third widely cited First Amendment theory argues that the
function of free speech is to promote individual autonomy or selfrealization. The autonomy theory focuses not on the value of speech to
the broader society, but on its enhancement of the speaker's and
listener's liberty. Thomas Scanlon defined autonomy as necessitating
the protection of an individual's freedom to engage in selfdetermination in forming his or her own opinions and beliefs. 242
While autonomy arguments are probably the least weighty
justification for First Amendment coverage of lies, even here a case can
be made. Laws barring investigative deceptions interfere with the
autonomous choices of journalists, government agents, and activists to
choose how to identify themselves in the context of an undercover
investigation. Autonomy arguments have tended to focus on the
freedom of the speaker to determine his or her own feelings, beliefs, and
thoughts without government interference rather than on the liberty to
frame (truthfully or falsely) one's identity. In that sense, lying does not
obviously serve the goal of autonomy. Still, there are arguments that
might focus more on the way that lies may promote the autonomy of
self-identity, whether it be for the purpose of individual self-esteem ("I
am the best law professor in the world"), to gain respect from others ("I
volunteer at the soup kitchen every week"), or to gain access to an area
where one believes illegal conduct may be occurring ("I am not affiliated
with any group antagonistic to your industry").
David Han has suggested that what he calls individual "selfdefinition" is an important aspect of autonomy that ought to be
recognized under First Amendment doctrine. 243 Thus, sometimes,
autobiographical lies may be a form of speech protected as a means of
promoting individual autonomy. As he observes, "Under any basic
a fundamental component of being an
conception of autonomy . .
autonomous individual is exercising control over who you are-and who
you are is, to a significant extent, a function of who you define yourself
to be to others." 244 Han's theory could offer an alternative basis for

242. Scanlon, supra note 23, at 215. In later work, Scanlon modified his views about speech
and autonomy. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U. PrIT.
L. REV. 519, 531-35 (1979). Other autonomy theorists take a slightly broader view that includes
the protection of the individual's ability to develop his or her powers and abilities and to control
his or her own destiny through the autonomy of decision making. Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
243. David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment's Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 92 (2012).
244. Id. at 99.
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understanding the Court's decision in Alvarez. 245 Alvarez provided a
biographical summary of his career after being elected to a local
political position and he claimed to have served in the military and to
have won the Congressional Medal of Honor. 246 None of this was true,
but the Court held that such lies were protected speech even though
they had seemingly minimal truth or governance value.
Consistent with this view, R. George Wright has suggested that
lying might be better examined as part of a broader moral context, in
which lies might advance personal autonomy and liberty in ways that
supersede their moral costs. 2 4 7 Analyzing lies in the historical context

of an imagined lie to a fugitive slave hunter or Nazi officer seeking to
find Jews during the Holocaust, Wright argues that lies might have
moral value in advancing the autonomy of the liar, and those she seeks
to protect from harm. 2 48 "The lie may be instead motivated by a sense
of the equal or irreplaceable value and infinite dignity of persons, or
even by genuine concern for the questioner's moral or spiritual wellbeing." 249 At least in the context of Ag Gag laws, the same moral claim
could be made for activists seeking to promote the dignity and
autonomy of non-human animals, a central tenet of many animal rights
groups. 250
Balanced against these arguments is the countervailing loss of
autonomy potentially experienced by the listener. This argument is
often used to explain why lies ought not to be protected under the First
Amendment. 251 Derived from the writings of Immanuel Kant and other
moral philosophers, this claim suggests that lies are morally
problematic because they deprive the listener of the very same
autonomy that free speech is designed to promote. 252 Kant was
245. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).
246. Id. at 2542.
247. Wright, supra note 7, at 1142 ("The obvious and quite substantial moral benefits of
'benevolent' lies should also be taken into account.").
248. See id. at 1145-46.
249. Id. at 1146.
250. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 239, at 239-40 (arguing that attempts to distinguish
humans from animals based on the "intrinsic dignity of human beings" disregard a lack of actually
relevant distinguishing characteristics).
251. See Varat, supra note 7, at 1114 ("[T]he First Amendment's protection against
government efforts to prevent persuasion rests on respect for people's autonomy. Lies disrespect
autonomy so fundamentally that they can lay no claim to that protection."); Wright, supra note 7,
at 1143 (explaining the Kantian principle that 'lying whenever a lie is advantageous . . . would
sabotage the credibility of assertions . . . and appeal of the cultural institution of making and
paying attention to verbal assertions").
252. Wright, supra note 7, at 1145 ("The first inherent disvalue is the immediate restriction
of the deceived's freedom.") (quoting Joseph Kupfer, The Moral Presumption Against Lying, 36
REV. METAPHYSICS 103, 103 (1982)).
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something of a truth "absolutist" in that he rejected an instrumental
theory under which lies could ever be understood in context as socially
valuable. 253 As David Strauss has written:
[The] Kantian account gives relatively clear content to the notion that lying is wrong
because it violates human autonomy. Lying forces the victim to pursue the speaker's
objectives instead of the victim's own objectives. If the capacity to decide upon a plan of
life and to determine one's own objectives is integral to human nature, lies that are
2
designed to manipulate people are a uniquely severe offense against human autonomy. 54

A couple of factors might mitigate the concern over listener
autonomy in the context of investigative deceptions used to gain access
to private, commercial business operations. First, the employer or
fellow employee who is lied to and allows access to a commercial facility
is unlikely to be directly harmed by the lie in any material way. That
is, to the extent that her autonomy is lost by being persuaded to permit
an undercover investigator to enter the facility, it is not a personal loss,
as it would be if her individual privacy were somehow compromised by
the exchange. Lies that facilitate access to intimate, personal details
may very well work too much harm to the listener's autonomy to be
tolerated by the autonomy theory. 255 One could argue that the
business's autonomy is harmed by the lie insofar as it has lost complete
control over its property. But it is not clear that a conception of
autonomy grounded in an indiscriminate right to be free from
whistleblowers and exposes ought to be taken seriously. As long as
there are limits on collecting obviously protected information such as
trade secrets or tax records, the harm of that autonomy loss is minimal
or non-existent. Moreover, there may even be an "unclean hands"
argument that where unsavory or illegal conduct is occurring and the
business's employees are arguably complicit (or vicariously
responsible), the loss of listener autonomy that occurs when an

253. Id. at 1143.
254. David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334, 355 (1991); see also C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 910 (2002) ("With lies, the speech operates by tricking the other, purposefully undermining
the other's capacity for successfully autonomous acts."). Other leading scholars have rejected the
view that lying harms the autonomy of listeners in all contexts. Wright, for example, suggests that
a lie might paradoxically enhance rather than diminish the listener's autonomy. Wright, supra
note 7, at 1145-46. He observes, "[clould not a lie to a murderous SS officer also promote the
rationality, personhood, or dignity of that SS officer over the longer term?" Id. at 1143.
255. In addition, there may be circumstances in which the listener's individual autonomy is
compromised by an investigative lie because it is tantamount to coercion over their personal will.
Cf. Norton, supranote 121 (discussing when lies by law enforcement officers, which are generally
permissible, cross over to being impermissibly coercive).
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investigator lies to gain access to the property is at least less of a
concern than it would be in other contexts. 256

V. DOCTRINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
OF HIGH VALUE LIES

The previous section demonstrates that investigative deceptions
are a type of speech that should be covered by the First Amendment.
The remaining task is to describe how current doctrine would apply to
laws that regulate or prohibit such lies, including Ag Gag statutes. In
the following sections, we offer a thorough discussion of the appropriate
level of scrutiny and identify the key limiting principles applicable to
First Amendment protections for high value lies.
A. Consideringand Applying the ProperLevel of Scrutiny for Laws
CriminalizingInvestigative Deceptions
1. Strict Scrutiny
a. Reading the Alvarez Plurality Tea Leaves
Alvarez is the lone Supreme Court decision to directly address
First Amendment protection of lies. Because it is a fractured opinion,
the status of lies under the Constitution remains obscured. Six Justices
clearly held that some lies-even intentional, self-promoting liesconstitute protected speech. 257 Likewise, these same six Justices
recognize that only lies that are likely to cause legally cognizable or
tangible harm to the listener fall outside of the First Amendment as
unprotected speech. 258 Indeed, even the three dissenting Justices
acknowledged that only those lies that "inflict real harm and serve no
legitimate interest" fall outside of the protection of the First
Amendment. 259 On this point, then, there is unanimity-lies that cause
no real harm are protected.
256. Critics might argue that the unclean hands response offers a justification for lying that
is entirely ex post. That is, an investigator would not know at the time she entered a facility
whether she would necessarily find unlawful or unethical behavior on the premises, yet will have
already compromised the listener's autonomy. While we acknowledge this concern, we maintain
that the notion that the listener is affected entirely in a business or professional context still
mitigates the autonomy concerns even if it does not eliminate them altogether.
257. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544-45 (2012).
258. Id. at 2545; id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). For a thorough
discussion of what constitutes a "cognizable harm," see infra Section V.B.
259. The dissenters' disagreement, then, was not over the relevant legal principles but over
their application to the Stolen Valor Act. In their view, lies about receiving the Medal of Honor
were valueless and caused a tangible diminution to the prestige of military awards. Alvarez, 132
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The question of whether the Constitution requires strict or
merely heightened scrutiny of government regulation of lies, however,
is less clear. Because Alvarez includes no majority consensus on the
applicable standard of review, lower courts must toil through the
impenetrable rule from Marks v. United States, which instructed that
non-majority opinions will generally create precedent. 260 Under the
Marks rule, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." 261
Of course when it comes to judicial reasoning, the term "narrow" is
rarely illuminating. For example, when the fundamental difference
between the opinions concurring in the result is a core doctrinal
disagreement, such as determining the applicable level of scrutiny, it
may very well be that the Marks rule does not help us discern a single
clear holding on that question. 2 62 The difference between intermediate
and strict scrutiny is arguably one of kind, not of breadth, and so it is
simply not the case that one opinion is necessarily narrower than the
other. 263 Marks's narrowest grounds rule cannot and does not stand for
the view that when the Court is fractured, the holding constitutes the
opinion that articulates the most parsimonious view of constitutional
rights. 264
Accordingly, while Alvarez reflects a clear majority rejecting the
notion that lies are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment,
it does not squarely answer the question of the degree of scrutiny that
S. Ct. at 2558 (Alito, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that there is a "long tradition of efforts
to protect our country's system of military honors." Id. at 2557-59 (noting a "proliferation of false
claims concerning the receipt of military awards" and describing the "substantial harm" by, among
other things, "debas[ing] the distinctive honor of military awards').
260. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
261. Id. at 193.
262. Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic
Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 994 (2013) (explaining the Marks rule's proper application).
263. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, in the
absence of a true commonality of reasoning, there is no binding holding from the Supreme Court);
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a
plurality holding is "the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented
if forced to choose").
264. There is no serious argument that "narrowest" is synonymous with the stingiest vision
of the Constitution. Take, for example, the famous plurality decision addressing the proper
constitutional test for assessing a method of execution in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). There
is considerable debate regarding what is the narrowest opinion, but no one has argued that the
narrowest construction of the Eighth Amendment-the opinion of Justices Thomas and Scalia-is
the controlling precedent simply because it would result in the fewest successful challenges. The
narrowest grounds calculation must consider whether there is some core analytic overlap between
the opinions, and, if not, identify the opinion that is most case-specific and factually driven.
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applies. A prior study of the Court's application of the Marks rule
suggests that when, as in Alvarez, there is no true common denominator
of reasoning, no true narrowest grounds, the Court tends to defer to the
lower courts in how to define the precedent from a prior Supreme Court
plurality. 265 Under this view, the precedential value of a plurality may
be upward flowing from lower courts to the Supreme Court. 266 Notably,
since Alvarez, a number of lower courts have held that strict scrutiny is
the proper level of scrutiny for government actions prohibiting lies.2 67
b. Restrictions on High Value Lies Warrant Strict Scrutiny
The first two-thirds of this Article develops the claim that not all
lies are equal and that lies told in order to gain access to private, though
non-intimate, information of considerable public concern ought to be
recognized as distinct from other mistruths. These investigative
deceptions-misrepresentations that made the work of Upton Sinclair
and his modern day heirs possible-should receive the highest level of
constitutional protection. Insofar as investigative deceptions advance
the goals of self-governance, truth, and autonomy undergirding the
freedom of speech, such lies deserve correspondingly more protection
than lies that are protected only because the failure to do so might chill
otherwise protected speech. That is to say, the protection of
instrumentally valuable lies surely must be stronger than the
protection of lies that are of no value. 268 Accordingly, whether Alvarez
prescribes strict scrutiny for all lies is of no moment when assessing
whether high value lies are deserving of strict scrutiny. Indeed, in a
decision addressing the constitutionality of a law that criminalized lies
about ballot initiatives, the Eighth Circuit held that because the law in
265. Marceau, supra note 262, at 994.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 14-5335, 2014 WL
6676517, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2014) (recognizing that when the lies at issue are "political
expression," the speech is "entitled to even greater First Amendment protection than the speech
at issue in Alvarez"); In re Jud. Campaign Compl. Against O'Toole, 141 Ohio St. 3d 355, 363 (2014)
(assuming the application of strict scrutiny and observing "Alvarez does not consider whether the
state can ever have a compelling interest in restricting false speech solely on the basis that it is
false so that such prohibition could withstand strict scrutiny."); O'Neill v. Crawford, 132 Ohio St.
3d 1472, 1473 (2012) ("The Alvarez court ... recognized that not only must the restriction meet
the 'compelling interest test,' but the restriction must be 'actually necessary' to achieve its
interest."); State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 517 (W. Va. 2012) (quoting the
plurality opinion from United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012), for the view that
"[W]hen the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the least
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.").
268. See Norton, supra note 7, at 163 (arguing that "[t]he very ubiquity and diversity of lies
thus supports a presumption that lies are fully protected by the First Amendment and that
government therefore generally may not regulate them unless it satisfies strict scrutiny.").
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question regulated politically salient speech on the basis of its content,
it must be subject to strict scrutiny. 269 This reasoning is consistent with
a wide range of First Amendment doctrine and theory.
i.

Strict Scrutiny Under Standard First Amendment Doctrine

Even setting aside for a moment Alvarez and other lie-specific
case law, it would be "puzzling"2 70 to conclude that laws banning
investigative deceptions would not receive strict scrutiny. Any law that
is content discriminatory is subject to the most exacting standard of
review, 271 which requires that the government show that the law in
question is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
governmental interest. 272
Taking Ag Gag laws as an example, laws that criminalize
investigative deceptions are indisputably content-based. For example,
outlawing only parodies or jokes but not more serious types of
expression is a content-based limitation.273 Similarly, for the law to
distinguish between truthful and untrue speech is to favor one form of
content over another. 274 If we have successfully made the case that
exempt from
are not categorically
investigative deceptions
constitutional scrutiny, then Ag Gag laws and their ilk are content
based on the distinction between true and false content alone. 2 7 5

269. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011) (summarizing
Supreme Court doctrine and recognizing that speech limits-even if indirect, such as limits on tort
verdicts-that limit speech "about matters of public concern" are subject to the highest scrutiny)
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)); id. at 636 ("We do not, of course, hold
today that a state may never regulate false speech in this context. Rather, we hold that it may only
do so when it satisfies the First Amendment test required for content-based speech restrictions:
that any regulation be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.").
270. Erwin Chemerinsky, The FirstAmendment and the Right to Lie, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 5,
2012, 1:57 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the-firstamendmentandthe-right
_to_1ie/ [http://perma.ccYR3Q-4BAK] (summarizing the Alvarez concurrence suggesting
intermediate scrutiny).
271. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
272. Id. at 668. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (noting that
to impose strict liability for false statements would have a "chilling" effect on other constitutionally
valuable speech).
273. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680.
274. Analogous reasoning compels the conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to investigative
deceptions, like those criminalized by Ag Gag statutes. In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, the
only reported decision in a challenge to an Ag Gag law, Judge Winmill denied a motion to dismiss
by explaining, in relevant part, that laws criminalizing lies are content-based and warrant the
application of strict scrutiny. 44 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1023-24 (D. Idaho 2014). But see SHIFFRIN,
supra note 7, at 125-29 (arguing that laws regulating untruthful speech are not content based,
but rather distinguish violations of the law based on the speaker's state of mind).
275. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-24.
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Moreover, Ag Gag laws are content-based for a second,
independent reason. In addition to discriminating between truthful and
false speech, these laws discriminate based on the content of speech
because they specifically apply only to statements made in the context
of gaining access to agricultural facilities. The reason the Court imposes
heightened scrutiny on viewpoint and content discriminatory laws is
that such laws raise serious concerns that the government is using its
power to control and distort public discourse. 276 State action that
protects agricultural facilities, but not other private business
enterprises, suggests that the government wishes to skew the debate
about agricultural practices by steering public scrutiny away from this
particular range of topics.

27 7

A generally applicable law prohibiting all

investigative deceptions would present a different constitutional
question. 278 But Ag Gag laws criminalize only deceptions used to gain
access and report on a single, massive and publicly important industry;
indeed, in the rural states where these laws are most common,
agriculture may be the largest industry in the state. 279 These same
legislatures have not generally prohibited misrepresentations made to
gain access to child care facilities, large banks, workplaces where labor
law violations may be occurring, or companies that dispose of toxic

276. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991) (stating that content discrimination "raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace").
277. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943, at
*12 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) ("[The State fails to provide a legitimate explanation for why
agricultural production facilities deserve more protection from these crimes than other private
businesses."). As stated earlier, the Court has recently made it clear that a law's underlying
purpose is relevant to whether it is content-based. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218,
2228 (2015).
278. Generally applicable laws that have only an incidental effect on speech activities
typically are subject to intermediate scrutiny. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968). Accordingly, traffic laws and the like are common examples of laws that, though they may
impede a journalist's efforts to gather a story, are not unconstitutional. By contrast, laws that
criminalize the very means of gathering a story (misrepresentation) and do so in a manner that
distinguishes among the type of targets for investigations can hardly be considered generally
applicable laws. If a state enacted a law that banned all investigative misrepresentations across
all industries, serious First Amendment concerns would still arise, both because the law threatens
to be substantially overbroad and because it has much more than a merely incidental effect on
expression. This scenario has recently become a reality. The state of North Carolina recently
enacted, over the Governor's veto, a statute creating a sweeping civil tort claim for all employers
who are the subjects of investigative actions on the part of their employees. 2015 N.C. SESS. LAWS
50.
279. See Chris Kirk, Maps: Agriculture in the U.S. and Around the World, SLATE.COM (June
19, 2012 3:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2012/06/a-map-of
_farmers_in_the_u_aandworld_.html [http://perma.cc/G8B4-DTP7] (showing the percentage of
farmers per thousand people in each U.S. county).
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waste, just to name a few examples of other regulated businesses where
undercover investigations have been conducted.
Ag Gag laws single out the agricultural industry for protection
against misrepresentations. Both the distinction between truth and
falsity, and the effort to safeguard a single industry from investigative
reporters and activists, thereby driving certain information from the
marketplace of public discourse, are independently sufficient to trigger
strict scrutiny for Ag Gag laws.
That is not to say that investigative deceptions can never be
criminalized. A journalist's efforts to expose national security matters
or trade secrets may well constitute the sort of lie for which strict
scrutiny is satisfied. 280 A trickier question would be the use of deception
to gain access to a facility or process by someone who does not know
that trade secrets or other interests would be exposed or injured.
Assuming trade secret laws and other privacy protections of this sort in
the commercial context can withstand constitutional scrutiny, 281 we
think that the proper standard in assessing liability under the laws in
such circumstances would be the public figure defamation standard.282
That is, if the investigator is malicious or reckless in revealing or
benefitting from such protectable interests, then the lies told to gain
access and the publication of such information can be criminalized. In
this way, persons who lie with the intent of exposing a competitor's
trade secrets or to cause physical damage to the facility can be punished
without risking First Amendment injury. By contrast, most lies that
result in the exposure of unsavory or illegal industry practices but do
not compromise intellectual property or trade secrets will be protected
insofar as they are not made with the intent or reckless disregard of the
risk of exposing trade secrets or similarly protectable interests. 283
Upton Sinclair may have gained access to things that the
slaughterhouse owner wished he had not seen, but he did not expose

280. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (2014):
Privacy regulations are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. . . . Although the First
Amendment creates a barrier to the enforcement of new and existing information laws,
that barrier is not insurmountable. It simply requires, as it should, a lively inquiry into
whether the harms caused by the collection of information are probable enough, and
serious enough, to outweigh the right to learn things.
281. Id.
282. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
283. To the extent that trade secret liability is defined too broadly or generically, these laws
would themselves fail First Amendment scrutiny. And if deception is used to access a facility that
contains trade secrets or the like, then certainly the investigator or reporter can take precautions
to avoid revealing any of these protected secrets, just as any other employee would do. A failure to
take such precautions might justify liability under a statute punishing reckless disclosures of such
information.
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(nor did he intend or care to expose) any properly protected intellectual
property.
ii. Strict Scrutiny under R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
An alternative doctrinal approach to examining the
constitutionality of Ag Gag laws and other prohibitions on investigative
lies would not even necessitate the prior conclusion that investigative
deceptions are speech covered by the First Amendment. In R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court held that laws regulating even
unprotected speech must be subjected to strict scrutiny if they
discriminate within that category of unprotected speech on the basis of
content. 284 In that case, the defendant was charged under a city
ordinance that prohibited the display of a symbol that the defendant
has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" after he allegedly
burned a cross on the property of an African-American family. 285 The
state courts that had interpreted the ordinance had narrowed its
construction to cover only conduct that was itself unprotected speech in
the form of fighting words as defined by the Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.286
Notwithstanding the assumption that the ordinance only
prohibited fighting words, the Court held that the ordinance was
facially unconstitutional because "it prohibits otherwise permitted
speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." 287 As
explained by Justice Scalia,
What [the cases announcing categories of unprotected speech] mean is that these areas of
speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are
categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the
288
vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.

The Court elaborated further by drawing on the example of unprotected
defamation. "[T]he government may proscribe libel," it said, "but it may
not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel
critical of the government." 28 9 By similar reasoning, even if the
government could criminalize lying in general (or lying to gain access

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 384.
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more specifically), criminalizing lies to gain access and expose the
conduct in only a single industry must be subject to strict scrutiny.
The regulation of lies by Ag Gag laws and similar statutes
discriminates based on the type of facility sought to be accessed, and in
some instances based on whether the individual intends to help or hurt
the industry. 290 Thus, even if investigative deceptions might be
generally proscribable, these laws act as content-based discrimination
"unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." 291
To make this point more concrete, consider that the Alvarez
plurality in dicta suggests that not all lies will constitute protected
speech. In particular both the plurality and the concurring opinion
single out lies that harm another party, such as fraudulently obtaining
employment for which one is not qualified, as an example of the type of
lie that may be proscribed. 292 As the plurality explains, "[w]here false
claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable
considerations, say offers of employment," the First Amendment
generally provides no protection. 293 On its face this passage seems to
provide support for the view that laws criminalizing misrepresentations
to gain employment are not protected by the First Amendment. 294 But
when the prohibition is industry specific (or motivated by speech
suppressing impulseS 295), strict scrutiny is required.
The crux of R.A. V's analysis is that while the government may
suppress certain categories of speech because of the harms that are
uniquely associated with their expression, it may not discriminate
within those categories because of its hostility toward its nonproscribable content or viewpoint. If it is permissible to criminalize all
290. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (West 2015) (criminalizing lies used to gain
employment but only if the individual intends to cause (economic) harm to the agricultural
industry).
291. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 383-84.
292. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
293. Id.
294. Obviously, criminalizing lies to gain access unrelated to employment are unaffected by
this dicta from Alvarez. Such lies are criminalized by Ag Gag statutes. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §187042(1)(a)-(c). More importantly, as we have already argued, we think that this superficial reading
of Alvarez is misguided. In the context of investigations, one is not exaggerating credentials to gain
employment and so the harm, if any, suffered by the business is not caused by the lie (understating
one's education for example). Read in context, the passage about gaining employment in Alvarez
is clearly referring to attempts to defraud an employer by securing wages from a job for which one
is not qualified.
295. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of GovernmentalMotive in
FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 452 (1996) (recognizing that the core inquiry in
assessing whether a law is content based is ferreting out improper legislative motive). See also
Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, FirstAmendment Overbreadth,and ImproperLegislative
Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 85-87 (2003) (arguing for an expanded application of First
Amendment overbreadth law to uncover discriminatory government motives).
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threats, but impermissible to criminalize only threats based on a
particular viewpoint, it is flawed to assume that because
(hypothetically) all lies to gain employment may be criminalized, lies to
gain employment in one particular industry to expose misconduct can
be criminalized.
Even were we to concede that false statements of fact are a
particularly worthless and harmful category of expression in the
context of gaining employment or access, the state would still be
constitutionally forbidden to criminalize lies in a selective manner
reflecting its interest not in promoting truthfulness generally, but in
inhibiting lies in a particular realm of public discourse. 296 As one
leading First Amendment scholar has observed, "Singling out one or a
small group of lies for government condemnation, while leaving others
unregulated, signifies a 'realistic possibility that official suppression of
ideas is afoot."'

297

2. Intermediate Scrutiny - High Value Lies as a
Hybrid Speech Category
Although we think it less plausible, we consider an additional
possibility, which is that laws targeting investigative deceptions might
be subject to intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny under First
Amendment doctrine. 298 Justice Breyer's concurrence in Alvarez
suggests a preference for intermediate scrutiny of laws regulating
lies. 299 As discussed above, investigative deceptions like those
criminalized by Ag Gag statutes are materially distinguishable from
the sort of lie at issue in Alvarez, which did not touch upon issues of
public concern. Thus, even if Justice Breyer's concurrence were viewed
as the Alvarez holding on this question, his opinion would not
necessarily be controlling in the context of high value, investigative
deceptions. Nonetheless, even if intermediate scrutiny did apply, we
think such laws are still vulnerable to invalidation.
296. Although this type of discrimination differs slightly from content regulation about
particular ideas, as in R.A. V., it is the conceptual parallel of that decision. Ag Gag laws are not
designed to address the distortion of truth in the same sense as, say, perjury laws, but rather are
motivated by the government's desire to prohibit revealing information about a particular topicthe mistreatment of animals by commercial agriculture facilities. This is not just any run of the
mill topic, but one that has been the subject of intense public discourse in recent years. Such laws
regulate lies not for the sake of regulating falsity, but to protect big agriculture from public
scrutiny.
297. Varat, supra note 7, at 1118 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)).
298. See Norton, supra note 7, at 183 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard for evaluating government regulation of some low value lies).
299. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) ("[Ilin this case, the Court's term
'intermediate scrutiny' describes what I think we should do.").
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When a law is deemed content-neutral,3 0 0 the Supreme Court
employs a formulation of intermediate scrutiny drawn from its cases
evaluating the constitutionality of content neutral regulations of the
time, place, or manner of expression in public forums. 30 1 In these cases,
the Court has said that such laws must be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest," and they must "leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information." 302 While
this test is not as rigorous as strict scrutiny, it still imposes a
substantial burden on the government in defending a law and is
considered a form of heightened review.3 0 3 Indeed, the Court's most
recent invocation of intermediate scrutiny in McCullen v. Coakley is
revealing. 304 Not only did the Court strike down a Massachusetts law
that criminalized the mere conduct of standing (even without speaking
or picketing) within 35 feet of the entrance to an abortion clinic, it
emphasized that laws that impinge speech for content-neutral reasons
will face exacting scrutiny. 305 The Court explained that laws designed
to avoid the problems associated with speech are strongly disfavored:
Even though the Act is content neutral, it still must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest [and] [t]he tailoring requirement does not simply guard

300. The analogy to the time, place, or manner cases is not a perfect one, of course, because
as we have already argued, Ag Gag laws are inherently content-based. But intermediate scrutiny
is applied in some other areas of First Amendment law as well, even where the laws arguably
regulate based on content. Thus, it is possible that lies might be treated as a sui generis type of
speech, like commercial speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (distinguishing between the protections afforded commercial
speech versus other speech).
301. Another version of intermediate scrutiny had previously emerged in cases examining
the constitutionality of government regulations of expressive conduct. In those cases, the Court
held that the regulation can only be upheld if "it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968). The Court has essentially acknowledged that time, place, or manner and speech/conduct
tests are now the same standard. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 298, 316 n.8 (1984); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First
Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141,
167-70 (1995) (describing the Court's merger of the time, place, or manner test with the
speech/conduct test as the "WardIO'Brien rule"). Moreover, it is "the Ward statement of the test
[that] has become the standard formulation." Bhagwat, supra, at 168. For a general discussion of
the intermediate scrutiny test, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) ("The Supreme Court tests the
constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions with an essentially open-ended form of
balancing.").
302. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
303. Bhagwat, supra note 301, at 169.
304. 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
305. Id. at 2526, 2534-35.
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against an impermissible desire to censor. The government may attempt to suppress
speech not only because it disagrees with the message being expressed, but also for mere
convenience. Where certain speech is associated with particular problems, silencing the
speech is sometimes the path of least resistance. But by demanding a close fit between
ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents the government from too readily
"sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency." 306

Accordingly, the application of intermediate scrutiny to laws targeting
investigative deceptions would require the state to articulate and
defend its interests in criminalizing such lies by showing that the
regulation is narrowly tailored to serve an important government
interest.
A general ban on all lies used for undercover access in an
industry is surely too blunt a tool to survive such exacting scrutiny.
Assuming, for example, the government interest were in preventing
people from fraudulently obtaining employment and thereby
performing jobs they are not qualified to carry out, there is no material
harm arising from such conduct if the undercover investigator is
actually capable of performing the job tasks at hand. Thus, the law
could be more narrowly drawn to address misrepresentations that
actually interfere with the employer's ability to hire employees capable
of performing their assigned duties. In this way, laws that prohibit lying
about having a law license or similar professional training would likely
survive First Amendment scrutiny. A general ban on lies to gain
employment (much less general bans on all misrepresentations to gain
access, which include employment lies) would not likely survive
intermediate scrutiny.
Similarly, if the state's interest is preventing the illegal
acquisition of confidential information, such as trade secrets, a law
could be narrowly drawn to regulate that conduct in particular. Indeed,
most trade secret and intellectual property laws are likely
constitutional for exactly this reason. By contrast, laws that are written
as broadly as the Ag Gag statutes manifest an intention not to address
legitimate interests in property or fraud prevention, but to criminalize
the conduct of undercover investigators in order to suppress their
speech.
Finally, intermediate scrutiny also requires that the law in
question leave "open ample alternative channels" for the speech
impinged by the law in question. 307 For any industry, but particularly
in the agricultural industry, which has strongly advocated for laws
protecting it from scrutiny by investigators, it is unlikely that any

306.
307.

Id. at 2534 (quoting Riley v. Nat'1 Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
Id. at 2522.
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viable alternatives to undercover whistleblowing exist. 3 08 The lies are
speech that facilitates the production of undercover videos showing the
real time production of food. Merely pointing to the ability to protest on
the street, distribute leaflets, or hold rallies is no answer to the law's
ability to utterly foreclose access to investigations of the agricultural
industry. There really is no ample alternative forum through which
activists and journalists might carry out this type of expression, and
thus, even under intermediate scrutiny, these Ag Gag laws would likely
be found to be an unconstitutional infringement of expression. 309
B. Limiting Principles-CognizableHarm as a
Preconditionto CriminalizingLies
The previous discussion attempts to situate investigative
deceptions within the Court's tiers of scrutiny for the First Amendment
and concludes that strict scrutiny most likely applies to laws
criminalizing such lies. But even if investigative deceptions are
recognized as high value speech subject to strict scrutiny, it is
important to note that the law would still leave the government ample
room to regulate material misrepresentations that endanger
identifiable and tangible privacy and property interests. 3 10 A critical

308. See generally Second Brief of Amicus Curiae the Idaho Dairymen's Association, Inc. Re:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed on November 18, 2014, Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 (No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW) (advocating for the upholding of
Idaho's agricultural security legislation as, inter alia, a legislative judgment to protect the
vulnerable agriculture industry over First Amendment rights used to do harm).
309. Ag Gag laws and similar statutes criminalizing investigative deceptions are also
vulnerable to claims that they are unconstitutionally overbroad. The First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine requires that laws be invalidated when they restrict significantly more
speech than the First Amendment allows. Criminal statutes must be examined particularly
carefully. Such laws are particularly dangerous from a First Amendment perspective because of
their potential to chill important expression. Overbreadth law protects individuals who "may well
refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible
of application to protected expression." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). Ag Gag laws
typically criminalize a wide range of conduct, some of which is not protected by the First
Amendment (such as using force to enter, obtain records from, or obtain employment with an
agricultural production facility), but a substantial amount of which is protected expression under
the First Amendment, such as using misrepresentations to further an animal welfare
investigation. Because the laws often prohibit any type of misrepresentation used to gain access
to an agricultural operation, they reach a wide range of expression, including, but not limited to,
stating a false need to use a restroom to gain access to a property and failing to disclose one's
political affiliations. As such, they sweep well beyond the scope of conduct that may be
constitutionally regulated. Moreover, a law is more likely to be deemed overbroad if it is impinging
speech of particular political salience. Richard Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853, 908 n.259 (1991).
310. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943, at *4
(D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) ("[Llaws against trespass, fraud, theft, and defamation already exist. These
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piece of the doctrinal framework for understanding high value lies is
developing a coherent set of limiting principles, which we attempt to do
in this final section.
The most significant limiting principle is easily stated: lies that
cause cognizable harm fall outside the ambit of the First Amendment's
protection. 311 Both the plurality and Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Alvarez recognized this as a limit on the protections afforded to lies by
noting variously that the lie must not produce "legally cognizable
harm"3 12 or be used to gain "material advantage," 3 13 and that the lie
must not have caused "actual injury" 3 14 or "specific harm."3 15 Under this
view, the government may not criminalize lying "in contexts where
harm is unlikely." 316 As we discuss in this section, it is, therefore,
necessary to define with some specificity what constitutes a legally
cognizable harm in the context of investigative deceptions. Regulations
of lies that cannot fairly be regarded as the legal cause of an injury are
protected speech and subject to either strict or intermediate scrutiny,
depending on the analysis above.
As Professor Varat has observed, there are two main categories
of potential interests that might limit First Amendment protection for
lies designed to secure truthful information. The first possible interest
would be in protecting the listener from "psychological or pecuniary
harm" that the investigative deception caused "directly and
independently." 317 Second, there is a potential indirect harm caused by
"the subsequent publication of the accurate information obtained as the

types of laws serve the property and privacy interests the State professes to protect through the
passage of § 18-7042, but without infringing on free speech rights.").
311. But see Norton, supra note 7, at 187-99 (dividing harms into "second-party" (i.e.,
listener) and "third-party" (i.e., broader social) harms).
312. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012).
313. Id. at 2548. Read in context, it seems clear that the phrase "material gain" as used in
Alvarez is meant to be a synonym for fraud or injury-causing lie. Material gain in this context
implies that the prevaricator is deriving some tangible benefit from the deceived party-that is to
say, it is a species of unjust enrichment. By way of illustration, it is unpersuasive to suggest that
Dateline NBC gains a material advantage when it airs a report that exposes rampant child abuse
by a politician or daycare facility. Any gain is from exposing truth, not from taking something from
the deceived party. See also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 21 (Minn. 2014) (holding
that the state could not premise the prosecution of a defendant who had misrepresented his
identity online to others and induced them to commit suicide on the fraud exception to the First
Amendment because he had not "gained a material advantage or valuable consideration from his
false speech").
314. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
315. Id. at 2556; see also id. at 2255 (noting that "proof of injury" is a general requirement
for outlawing lies).
316. Id. at 2555.
317. Varat, supra note 7, at 1122-23.
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result of the lie." 3 18 We address each of these categories in the following
sections.
1. Possible Direct Harms
There are, of course, easy examples at both extremes of the
spectrum of direct harms caused by lies. Defamation of private persons
causes financial and reputational harm and falls beyond the scope of
First Amendment protection.3 19 The same is true of common law fraud,
which has actual injury as an element. 320 Likewise, crimes such as
perjury or lying to government officials impose materiality
requirements, which typically require a showing of some likely injury
or harm flowing from the lie, 3 2 1 and in any event lies that may cause
our democratic system of governance to falter are always safely
categorized as causing harm. On the other end of the spectrum fall
white lies and puffery. Intentionally lying and telling a co-worker that
he does good work or that he always dresses professionally, for example,
is clearly protected speech. 322
It is not terribly difficult to fit laws barring investigative
deceptions such as Ag Gag laws into this framework. To the extent these
laws impose criminal penalties on misrepresentations to gain access to
business operations, and do so without reference to any tangible harm
caused by the misrepresentations themselves, the First Amendment
protects the lie. The laws criminalize lies to gain the access itself. Any
other harm that occurs during the course of the entry-whether it be
theft, destruction of property, or loss of trade secrets-is independent
from and separately punishable under distinct criminal provisions.
Moreover, the sort of purely psychic injury that flows from having

318. Id. at 1123.
319. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985).
320. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.
321. Materiality in this context is often defined as lies which could have affected the outcome
of a governmental proceeding. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-501(1) (West 2014) (defining a
materially false statement as "any false statement . . . which could have affected the course or
outcome of an official proceeding, or the action or decision of a public servant, or the performance
of a governmental function"). More importantly, it is recognized that perjury undermines the
credibility and legitimacy of our justice system, thus causing a grave social harm. See, e.g., Nicole
Oelrich Tupman & Jason Tupman, No Lie About It, the Perjury Sentencing Guidelines Must
Change, 59 S.D. L. REV. 50, 65 (2014); John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for
Perjury in A Civil ProceedingIs Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil JudicialSystem, 79
TEMP. L. REV. 773, 785 (2006) ("[T]he judicial branch has a genuine interest in addressing the
harm that perjured testimony causes to the civil judicial system.").
322. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (Kozinski, J., concurring in denial
of rehearing en banc) (cataloguing a long list of such lies and identifying the lie as an essential
feature of modern communication).
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employees that may not like you (or your way of business) is not the sort
of cognizable harm that the Constitution recognizes as justifying
restrictions on speech. 323 Surely an employee's false attempts to suggest
that he enjoys his boss's company cannot be criminalized, nor can any
other form of non-loyalty that does not manifest itself in concrete
financial or other injuries.
a. Trespass
One likely basis for a legitimate assertion of harm to a protected
interest would be the property right to possession. One who enters
through deception, so the argument goes, would be harming the
exclusive possessory interests of an agricultural operations owner in
ways analogous to a trespass. 324 Notably, however, it is axiomatic under
common law that civil trespass complainants need not show actual
damages as a precondition of liability. 325 Liability for trespass will
presumptively only result in the imposition of nominal damages, and
any recovery of more than that requires a showing of actual damage. 326
That is to say, even if one strains to categorize entry gained through
deception as trespass (a view we reject and regard as inconsistent with
the weight of common law authority), 327 because the First Amendment
protects lies unless there is a showing of actual harm, trespass claims
could not be constitutionally enforced against those who access private
property through investigative misrepresentations. 3 2 8 To the extent
323. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (cataloguing the types of cognizable harms that can
justify regulation of lies without violating the First Amendment).
324. 17 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE § 10.2 (2d ed. 2014) (consent can be a defense to trespass,
"provided it was not obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or duress"); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (M.D.N.C. 1996); see also Laurent Sacharoff,
Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 882 (2014) (suggesting that trespass advances
privacy interests).
325.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 28 (3d ed. 2010).

326. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE, § 18-7008(A)(9) (establishing a misdemeanor for "[e]ntering
without permission of the owner or the owner's agent, upon the real property of another person
which" is posted with proper signage indicating that the property is private and may not be
trespassed upon). Interestingly, all other provisions of the Idaho criminal trespass statute entail
actual tangible harm to the property. Id. at § 18-7008(A)(1)-(8), (10). In contrast, it is common for
statutory trespass actions to require actual damages. While some state criminal trespass laws may
be enforced even without a showing of actual harm, the sort of privacy and property rights
protected by trespass laws are simply not served by punishing someone who gains access through
deception.
327. As Judge Posner has explained, entry into a business through deception where one
wants or invites entry (but does not know the investigator's true purpose) is not a true trespass
because in such cases there is no invasion of the "the specific interests that the tort of trespass
seeks to protect." Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995).
328. It bears reemphasizing that we think the sort of high value lie at issue when one seeks
to engage in an investigative misrepresentation is so materially distinct from the sort of valueless
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that prior cases suggested that harmless misrepresentations made in
order to gain access were actionable, such cases must be revisited in
light of Alvarez and the unequivocal mandate that lies that do not cause
cognizable harm are protected by the First Amendment.
Simply put, investigative misrepresentations that result in
access to non-intimate business settings for the purpose of exposing
information of public significance are protected by the First
Amendment. There is generally no legally cognizable harm caused by
entry gained through investigative deceptions. Needless to say, if an
undercover investigator actually caused physical damage to property,
personal injury, or some other tangible harm arising from an
investigation, she could be held criminally or civilly liable. But the act
of accessing a place through deception does not in and of itself cause a
legally cognizable harm. 329 The absence of any harm and the "inevitable
effect" of the laws on investigative journalism and other speech
activities doubtlessly implicate First Amendment protection. 330
b. Interference with Business Operationsand HiringPractices
Another interest that the state may legitimately protect is the
business's ability to lawfully carry out its operations. Thus, any
misrepresentation that leads to direct interference with business
operations (as distinguished from the self-inflicted economic harm
resulting from the exposure of unlawful treatment of animals) could be
constitutionally punished. Similarly, as we have already acknowledged,
the state has a legitimate interest in helping businesses protect trade
secrets and other proprietary information that allows them to fairly
compete in the economic marketplace. 331 Again, misrepresentations
that are used to secure such information are within the state's authority
to regulate because the harm prevented is concrete. But such conduct
is also clearly covered by more specific available legal remedies, and

lie at issue in Alvarez so as to call for an entirely different framework. Whatever limits Alvarez
imposes on the First Amendment protection available for lies of self-aggrandizement, a very
different set of First Amendment rules must apply to lies that facilitate the core purposes of free
speech, including the discovery of truth.
329. Lies to reveal intimate, private details may present different questions. As Judge Posner
has elaborated, "If a homeowner opens his door to a purported meter reader who is in fact nothing
of the sort-just a busybody curious about the interior of the home-the homeowner's consent to
his entry is not a defense to a suit for trespass." Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352.
330. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
331. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352 (explaining that "if a competitor gained entry to a business
firm's premises posing as a customer but in fact hoping to steal the firm's trade secrets," that would
be trespass) (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir.
1991)).
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therefore these interests are satisfied by less restrictive alternatives
than laws that ban investigative deceptions.
There is another way of viewing the state's interest in protecting
business operations, and that is through the idea that investigative
deceptions might interfere with a business's hiring practices, as
opposed to its general operations. As the Alvarez plurality emphasizes,
the First Amendment does not protect fraudulent speech, which may
include lies made in order to "secure moneys or other valuable
considerations, say offers of employment." 332 As to lies by undercover
investigators who seek employment, then, that might seem to be the
end of the matter, as a cursory reading of Alvarez would suggest that
employment securing lies are beyond the First Amendment. But the
matter is not so simple. Not all lies to gain employment are on equal
footing. The passages in Alvarez regarding employment are dicta
because the Court was not considering a lie used to get a job.
To put the issue of employment-based investigative deceptions
in context, consider the lies told by Xavier Alvarez and their potential
impact. Alvarez's lies about his military experience and honors were not
the sort of generic puffery that would have struck many judges as
protected speech; instead, they were the sort of lies that are designed to
gain credibility or at least reputational benefits for the speaker. 333 Such
lies, though perhaps not persuasive to many, were made, according to
the Supreme Court, in order to "gain respect" from the public and his
fellow board members. 334 In other words, the lie was made intentionally,
and with the purpose of securing undeserved respect in the community,
something that is not trivial to politicians. Yet because the lie did not
cause any legally cognizable injury, six Justices agreed it was protected
speech. 335 If a politician's lies about accomplishments, even military
honors, are protected speech, then the range of lies that cause
cognizable harm is relatively small and a vast range of mistruths is
entitled to First Amendment protection.
On the one hand, telling an employer that he has beautiful kids,
that you have always dreamed of working in a slaughterhouse, that you
are a born again Christian, or that you are an Iowa State football fan,
might very well affect his decision to hire you. So, too, might lies about
one's sexual orientation, love of sports, or marital status. In that sense
these lies are relevant, and maybe even material, to the employment
decision. But such lies are not the sort of harm-causing, material lies

332.
333.
334.
335.

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2542.
Id.
Id. at 2539.
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that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. Similarly,
pretending to seek employment to gain access to an industrial facility
for investigative purposes is unlikely to cause sufficient injury to place
the deception outside of the First Amendment's protection. The harm
that befalls an employer following such an employment decision, if any,
is the harm of publicly exposing non-defamatory information discovered
during the employment.3 3 6 Similarly, loyalty to a cause might make one
a more desirable employee, but omissions or misrepresentations about
political or ideological disagreement with the industry or employer fall
into the class of lies to which the First Amendment applies, because
they cause no harm as a matter of law.33 7 Simply failing to disclose an

investigative purpose does not, without more, cause legally cognizable
injury any more than failing to disclose a desire to unionize a
workplace. 338
In contrast, a wide range of employment related lies might easily
be characterized as falling outside the reach of the First Amendment.
Lying about one's qualifications for a job-claiming to have a law
degree, to have completed a surgical residency, or to have been trained
in the operation of heavy equipment, or other certificates or special
skills-is a quintessential example of a lie that typically does not enjoy
First Amendment protection. These lies relate to the essential function
or task of the job and can cause cognizable injury to employers by
exposing them to liability risks and an unsafe or unqualified work force.
Work that is done less safely or less productively is a cognizable injury
and lies made to shield inexperience or lack of credentials may cause
such injury. Such fraudulent representations might lead to actual and
direct harm to a business's operations and perhaps to third parties, as
in the case of an employee who creates safety risks because she is not

336. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (recognizing that both the "broadcast" and the "production of
the broadcast" are protected by the First Amendment and noting that the target of an undercover
expos6 has no legal remedy when the business secrets are revealed even if the "investigatory tactics
used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly").
337. Of course, answering this threshold question-the very question at issue in Alvarezdoes the First Amendment apply at all, is not the end of the inquiry. If a factual showing can be
made that lies about loyalty, among other things, materially harm the employer, then the lie might
still be criminalized because appropriately tailored legislation could satisfy strict scrutiny. But
whether the law satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny is generally a factual question. Our goal
is to make clear that as a legal matter such scrutiny should be applied, and that such a factual
showing must be made to justify upholding the law.
338. For example, "salting" is a common union practice whereby union organizers seeking to
organize a particular employer's workforce may apply for a job without disclosing their status as
a salt or union organizer. See, e.g., Harman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. NLRB, 280
F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The only purpose of criminalizing such a lie could be to discourage
salting, an activity protected by the [National Labor Relations] Act.").
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trained in the way she represented. 339 But when the lie has no bearing
on the requisite qualifications of the individual and no relationship to
the ability of the individual to safely and effectively perform the work
in question, the First Amendment is clearly implicated.
Even the wages paid to undercover investigators who secure
employment based on lies will not generally result in harm to the
employer that is proximately caused by the lies so long as the employees
competently perform all of their duties. That is to say, a lie that enables
a journalist to obtain paid employment and thus causes the employer
to experience the most concrete and measurable harm-a financial
expense-is not a legally cognizable harm. As the leading circuit court
decision on this point explains:
The question is what was the proximate cause of the issuance of paychecks to Dale and
Barnett. Was it the resume misrepresentations or was it something else? It was
something else. Dale and Barnett were paid because they showed up for work and
performed their assigned tasks as Food Lion employees. Their performance was at a level
suitable to their status as new, entry-level employees. Indeed, shortly before Dale quit,
her supervisor said she would "make a good meat wrapper." And, when Barnett quit, her
supervisor recommended that she be rehired if she sought reemployment with Food Lion
in the future. In sum, Dale and Barnett were not paid their wages because of
340
misrepresentations on their job applications.

If a lie to gain employment does not cause a legal "injury" to the
employer who pays the wages, then a wide range of injuries suffered by
34 1
the employer (or accessed party) are also not caused by the lie.
Certainly, the run-of-the-mill lie about one's interest in the field, an
underselling of one's credentials, a lie about political or ideological
beliefs, or a lie about investigative motives does not cause such harm,
and as such these lies fall within the First Amendment protections
recognized in Alvarez. 342
339. Thus, where tangible harms result, the constitutional implications are different. See
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1991) (rejecting newspaper's First Amendment
defense to suit by confidential source who claimed the newspaper breached its promise to protect
his identity from public disclosure, resulting in the loss of his job).
340. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that lost sales and profits were not caused by the undercover investigation but by the information
disclosed by the publication of the investigation's findings).
341. Food Lion stands for the proposition that the harms occasioned by investigative
reporting are "caused not by [the Reporter's] conduct but by Food Lion's own labor and food
handling practices." Symposium, Panel I: Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 424 (1997). Moreover, in the mass media, internet
age, the practical distinction between the media and non-media is crumbling, and so too must any
doctrinal distinctions between the professional and amateur person engaged in publicizing an
event. We are all to some degree, through Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and the like, journalists
now.
342. Of course, a wide range of injuries suffered by an employer can fairly be said to have been
caused by a lie. Criminalizing deceptive entry for the purpose of stealing intellectual property,
clients or trade secrets is likely permissible. Likewise, acts of terrorism or sabotage or the like
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Finally, while employers might argue that investigations
resulting from deceptive employment applications breach a common
law duty of loyalty arising from the employment relationship, those
duties have typically been limited to direct interference with the
employer's business operations, as where an employee directly
competes with her employer, misappropriates property, profits, or
business opportunities, or breaches confidences, such as revealing trade

secrets.343
c. Privacy and Autonomy
Finally, a law may legitimately protect reasonable expectations
of individual privacy on commercial premises. Speech is always entitled
to more protection if it is of public concern, and thus investigative
deceptions may serve to facilitate politically important speech on issues
relating to how certain industries are operating. But the importance of
speech about an industry does not make everything that happens at its
facilities politically significant. Thus, a law that forbade someone from
lying to gain access to private information, such as individual income
tax or health insurance records, or to areas of a commercial enterprise
in which expectations of privacy are commonplace, such as workplace
restrooms or employee locker/changing rooms, would advance valid
personal privacy concerns. Protection of personal privacy is a powerful
interest that might be sufficient to rebut the claim that a lie to gain
access is protected speech. While many lies to gain access will cause no
cognizable harm and are thus protected by the First Amendment, lies

committed by persons gaining access under false pretenses will always be the cause of injury to
the victimized employer or citizen, and the lies that make such acts possible could be criminalized.
Perhaps even lies about one's desire to remain employed for an extended period of time with the
same employer could give rise to actual cognizable harm in certain instances. But even in the face
of explicit lies about one's desire to remain employed, it may be difficult to show that such a lie
caused the damage in question. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 513:
Because Dale and Barnett did not make any express representations about how long
they would work, Food Lion is left to contend that misrepresentations in the
employment applications led it to believe the two would work for some extended period.
There is a fundamental problem with that contention, however. North and South
Carolina are at-will employment states, and under the at-will doctrine it is
unreasonable for either the employer or the employee to rely on any assumptions about
the duration of employment. At-will employment means that (absent an express
agreement) employers are free to discharge employees at any time for any reason, and
employees are free to quit.
If the state can meet the burden required under heightened scrutiny-a showing, for example, that
a particular lie or class of lies in a specific industry will cause financial harm based on empirical
data-then a law narrowly tailored to prevent that type of lie will likely survive constitutional
scrutiny.
343. Id. at 515-16.
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to gain access in ways that are harmful to personal dignity or to
concrete business interests do not deserve constitutional sanction.
Furthermore, independent of actual privacy concerns is the
previously discussed matter of the deprivation of listener autonomy. We
have already addressed that potential interest in our discussion about
3
how high value lies advance the speaker's autonomy. 44 In addition, as
Helen Norton has cautioned, the privileging of listeners' over speakers'
autonomy "would empower the government to punish a wide swath of
lies and thus frustrate an anti[-]paternalistic understanding of the First
Amendment." 345
d. Harms to Moral Interests in Truthful Communication
In her impressive scholarly work examining lying, Seana
Shiffrin has developed a broader theory about why the government
might regulate lies. She defines a lie as "an assertion that the speaker
knows she does not believe, but nevertheless deliberately asserts, in a
context that, objectively interpreted, represents that assertion as to be
taken by the listener as true and as believed by the speaker." 346 Thus,
her definition of lying, and the harm that it causes, is not limited to
what she distinctively labels as "deceptions," which are lies that
actually are intended to and result in affecting the listener's "mental
contents." 347 Even if no manipulation is accomplished, she claims that
lies work a unique harm on social relationships. Shiffrin argues that
"deliberately false speech does damage to our collective testimonial
framework by giving us reasons to doubt that a person's word is reliable
as such and that somber testimonial speech provides us with warrants
3
to take what is offered as representing what is believed." 48
While we take Shiffrin's moral claims seriously, we also
recognize that even accepting them as a generally sound proposition for
government regulation of lies, she articulates a limiting principle that

344. See supranotes 251-256 and accompanying text.
345. See Norton, supra note 7, at 190. A final possibility, raised in Seana Shiffrin's thoughtful
philosophical work on lying, is that the liar causes a moral harm to the listener by failing to treat
the listener as "an equal moral partner and as a rational agent who deserves to receive warrants
that she may accept as representing the listener's beliefs." SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 24. While we
concede that such moral harm might be generated in many contexts, we are at least skeptical that
in the investigative context it would be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the expressive interests
at stake, or more pragmatically, that a court would treat them as such.
346. SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 116.
347. Id. at 19.
348. Id. at 136. She elaborates: 'That is, deliberately insincere speech does collective harm
by ambiguating signals that function well only when fairly clear, signals whose preservation and
use are crucial for sustaining a functional moral and political culture." Id.
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we embrace as applying to investigative deceptions. In explaining why
she does not directly advocate for general legal regulation of lies, she
notes that "there are important pragmatic concerns about the potential
for governmental abuse that might, in some circumstances, be
unleashed by such regulation. 349 She counsels that regulations
therefore must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. We assert that laws
targeting investigative deceptions for criminal punishment fall within
an area that could well be argued to fall outside of Shiffrin's general
theory because these laws represent a high risk that the government is
abusing its regulatory powers to influence expression.
2. Possible Indirect Harms Caused By Public Disclosure
While it may be difficult to identify any direct harms from
investigative deceptions, it is easy to recognize indirect harms to an
employer exposed to an investigative reporting effort. One such harm
from investigative deceptions is the reputational injury that flows from
the publication of an expos6. Businesses universally seek to exclude
undercover investigations because of the risk of backlash in the form of
boycotts or bad publicity. The sources of alleged injury in cases of
undercover investigations are the publication and distribution of
information or images obtained by deception. For instance, the harm
that befalls a child care facility exposed by an undercover investigation
by Dateline NBC is the damage to its reputation when the public sees
the abusive treatment of children. The harm to a grocery store that is
revealed by an investigator to have repackaged adulterated meat
products is the public disclosure of its unsanitary practices. Likewise,
the harm to an agricultural facility from an undercover employment
investigation is the public reaction to the food safety, animal welfare,
35 0
and labor issues that are documented or reported by the investigator.
These can be serious harms. And at an intuitive level, they are
"caused" by the deceptive entry into the business. However, these are
349. Id. at 118.
350. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 963 (M.D.N.C. 1997) ("[I]t
was [Food Lion's] food handling practices themselves-not the method by which they were
recorded or published-which caused the loss of consumer confidence."). As Justice Brennan wrote
in his concurring opinion in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, "[O]rdinary principles of causation used
throughout the law of torts recognize that 'but for' causation . . . is never a sufficient condition of
liability." 471 U.S. 808, 844 n.9 (1985); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 41 ("[T]he causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond .... As a
practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected
with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability."); Kaimipono
David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REV.
279, 287-88 (2006) (discussing proximate causation in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions).
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not harms that can be addressed by criminal prohibitions. The harm
that flows from public disclosure and debate about non-defamatory
material is qualitatively different than direct harm to one's property or
privacy interests.35 1 When the harm sought to be avoided is the
publication of truthful information of public concern, the First
Amendment is uniquely implicated for at least two reasons. 352
First, harms borne of publication on issues of public concern, and
the concomitant public discourse that results, are harms that cannot
fairly be traced to the lie that created the opportunity for the
exposure.353 Of course, it is true that without publication there would
be no reputational harm, but the First Amendment cannot tolerate a
limitation on lies simply because they may lead to the publication of
information that is otherwise unavailable, at least not when the
information is non-intimate, non-defamatory, and of great political
importance.354 Just as the payment of wages by an employer to the

351. Cf. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 ("The publication damages Food Lion sought (or alleged)
were for items relating to its reputation, such as loss of good will and lost sales.").
352. See Susan M. Gilles, Food Lion as Reform or Revolution: "PublicationDamages" and
First Amendment Scrutiny, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 37, 60 (2000) ("[FoodLion] suggests a
unifying constitutional principle for all actions against the media precisely because it treats the
cause of action filed as irrelevant. First Amendment scrutiny is triggered if a plaintiff seeks
damages based on publication.").
353. But see Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) ("No interest protected
by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion to be enhanced
by the fact of later publication of the information that the publisher improperly acquired."). A
number of cases dating back to an era of very different and more robust expectations of privacy
reach similar conclusions, extending the media's liability for newsgathering torts to damages
arising from the ensuing publications. Sims, supranote 196, at 542 n.187 (1998) (compiling cases).
These cases have been rightly and roundly criticized by the few commentators who have paid
attention to them. See, e.g., Jacqueline A. Egr, Closing the Back Door on Damages: Extending the
Actual Malice Standardto Publication-RelatedDamages Resulting from Newsgathering Torts, 49
U. KAN. L. REV. 693, 712-13 (2001):
The Dietemann court erred in simply relying on the common law without incorporating
First Amendment principles into its decision. Although Dietemann allegedly sought
damages for invasion of privacy, the real harm, arguably, was his loss of reputation or
esteem in the community resulting from the publication of the article and photographs
disclosing his medical "quackery." Based on this theory, the court allowed Dietemann
to recover damages coextensive with those awarded for a defamation claim without
meeting the actual malice standard.
354. A case that is frequently cited in defense of Ag Gag statutes is Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
in which a plurality denied the press unlimited access to a county jail. 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). Even
if Houchins was correctly decided, it primarily stands for the proposition that there is no press
exceptionalism regarding rights of access to government property. Moreover, the controlling
concurrence in Houchins, Justice Stewart's opinion, explains that the First Amendment's freedom
of press is not a mere redundancy. Id. at 17. If ever the Court should recognize a distinct freedom
of press right, it should be in the context of lies to gain access to non-intimate details of great
political significance. In any event, we note here that our argument relies on the First
Amendment's Speech Clause, not the Press Clause, and that we assert that high value lies should
be constitutionally protected whether engaged in by members of the press or private citizens.
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employees conducting undercover investigations is not caused by the
lie, but by the work that was completed, the harm of publication is not
caused by the lie, but by the bad acts that the investigator recorded or
documented. The lie itself facilitates access, and if one does poor work
or appears disloyal, or overly snoopy, he can be fired at will; the lie is
instrumental to publication but is not the true cause of the harms of
publication. 355 As one commentator has summarized the law:
Courts have advanced several reasons why publication damages are not the proximate
cause of newsgathering torts. Some follow the Food Lion district court's conclusion that
the acts of the plaintiff depicted in the publication are the real proximate cause of
publication damages, rather than newsgathering torts that merely facilitated access to
356

learning about those acts. Others give no reason at all.

As explained above, lies that do not implicate the essential
qualifications or functions of the job, but rather omit or affirmatively
conceal journalistic or investigative motives, do not proximately cause
any legally cognizable harm by exposing unsavory or criminal acts
thereafter observed as an undercover employee. Such investigative
deceptions are surely a "but for" cause of the harm, in the sense that it
is logical to believe that an employer would not offer a job to someone
looking to document and expose unseemly or illegal industry practices.
But any reputational harm is not the product of a "natural and
357
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause."
The First Amendment cannot countenance a system in which the
exposure of one's wrongdoing is treated as an actionable cause of the
injury that flows from the exposure. The illegal or unsavory acts
documented by an undercover investigator are the intervening cause

355. The defamation related protections are designed to protect against allegations of injury
arising from publication. Some have argued that in newsgathering cases, the injury to the plaintiff
occurs during the investigation and prior to publication, thus arguing that speech rights are less
implicated by limits on investigations through generally applicable laws. Sims, supranote 196, at
526. In the Ag Gag context, however, exactly the opposite is true. The lie is the act of speech that
facilitates an investigation and eventual publication. Arguably any harm from publication is too
attenuated from the lie itself to justify depriving the lie of First Amendment protection.
356. Nathan Siegel, PublicationDamages in Newsgathering Cases, 19 CoMM. LAW., Summer
2001, at 11, 15 (2001) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The author also notes that
[o]ne reason the means by which raw information is obtained is not the proximate cause
of publication damages is because that raw information harms no one. Rather, damage
is caused by the way that information is subsequently presented in the publication,
including the meaning that the publication ascribes to it editorially. Thus, the content
and viewpoint of the ultimate publication, and the decisions made to express that
content, are the proximate causes of publication damages.
Id.; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943, at *6
(D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) ("[H]arm caused by the publication of true story is not the type of direct
material harm that Alvarez contemplates.").
357. James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 199 n.99 (1925)
(defining proximate cause).
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that breaks the chain. If an investigator gains employment at a child
care facility and documents unsafe or criminal interactions with the
children, neither the recording nor the recorder are the cause of the
harm that will flow to the business; rather the practices exposed are the
cause of harm. To imagine otherwise would be to turn the First
Amendment on its head insofar as the more newsworthy and politically
salient the investigative publication-the more effective the
investigation and the more damaging its revelations-the lower the
First Amendment protection and the more likely the state could
regulate.3 58 By that logic an undercover investigation showing that a
business is an ongoing criminal enterprise would be less protected than
an investigation that revealed no wrongdoing.
Defenders of Ag Gag laws and similar prohibitions might argue
that the actual cause of cognizable harm to a business is the editing of
the raw footage showing wrongdoing. Indeed, the history of Ag Gag laws
is replete with assertions by the agricultural industry and its
supporters that investigators of these industries unfairly edit their
recordings before publishing the videos. 359 Legislators and industry
representatives have repeatedly referred to the investigations as
orchestrated or staged, and on this basis justified the Ag Gag laws. Of
course, if the harm is from staged or unfairly edited videos, then "the
real conduct being challenged ....
is editorial conduct, not
newsgathering [and] ... publication damages should only be permitted
through the tort that challenges those decisions directly, defamation,
rather than through fraud or trespass claims that have nothing to do
with editorial content."3 60
Aside from that, the reputational harm to the investigated
business that results from investigative deceptions is not a legally
cognizable injury. 361 The Supreme Court has been steadfast in holding
358. Siegel, supra note 356, at 15 (2001) ("[C]ompanies would receive compensation for the
public's refusal to tolerate their potentially antisocial conduct.").
359. Susie Cagle, Two Views on Ag-Gags: The Investigator and the Farm Advocate, GRIST
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://grist.org/food/two-views-on-ag-gags [http://perma.ce/5XW3-UGFV]; Debate:
After Activists Covertly Expose Animal Cruelty, Should They Be Targeted With 'Ag-Gag" Laws?,
DEMOCRACY Now! (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/debateafter-activists
.covertly-expose-animal [http://perma.cc/D885-QEV5].
360. Siegel, supra note 356, at 15; see also id. at 16 ("Dieteman[n] was decided before much
of the First Amendment jurisprudence related to publication damages was developed. Moreover,
the question of whether publication damages should be rejected on proximate cause grounds was
not raised or addressed. Thus, Dieteman[n] did not address the principal issues currently relevant
to publication damages, and its authority may reasonably be questioned on that ground alone.").
361. One might object that the harm to companies whose conduct is exposed to public scrutiny
is real, even if not legally cognizable, and that the state might still have a legitimate interest in
protecting businesses from such harm. Alvarez, however, makes it clear that the relevant limit on
First Amendment protection for lying is predicated on the government demonstrating a legally
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that the First Amendment limits on defamation actions apply to all tort
or criminal actions that attempt to prevent reputational injuries based
on publication. 362 If the ultimate harm flowing from the lie is damage to
reputation caused by publication, then falsity of the publication and
malice, among other things, are constitutional prerequisites for
liability. 363 The lies used to facilitate access to a business (the conduct
of producing the undercover investigation), no less than the production
of the video itself, are insulated from civil or criminal liability by the
First Amendment's stringent limits on defamation. 364 To hold otherwise
would be inconsistent with the entire line of the Court's First
Amendment defamation cases, which assume the speech is false.
Indeed, it is likely that the agricultural industry's push for Ag Gag laws
is a direct response to the fact that they are unable to seek relief under
defamation law because the information revealed by undercover
investigations is truthful.
Moreover, the Court has recognized that the publication of
truthful information about a matter of public significance, even if
obtained unlawfully, may still be protected by the First Amendment. 365
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,366 the Court held that the media's publication of
the contents of a cellphone conversation regarding a highly contentious
union negotiation were protected by the First Amendment, even when
the media outlet had reason to believe that the conversation was
cognizable harm that is likely to result from such speech. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2545 (2012).
362. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (holding that state privacy tort
could not be enforced against a news magazine unless the plaintiff could prove that the story was
published with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (holding that damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on publication are unavailable unless the preconditions for defamation liability,
including actual malice, are satisfied); see also Sims, supra note 196, at 511 ("Food Lion argued
that its enormous financial losses were proximately caused by the PrimeTime Live broadcast and
should properly have been included in its compensatory damage award.").
363. Sims, supra note 196, at 556-57 ("In Food Lion,... injury to reputation . .. was an issue
in the case [and] Judge Tilley therefore recognized that Food Lion's attempt to link its reputational
injuries to the damages caused by the newsgathering torts without proving falsity or actual malice
was, in fact, an attempt to circumvent Gertz and [New York Times].").
364. Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the
Refortification of Defamation Law's Constitutional Aspects, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 665, 666 (1989)
("Recent years have witnessed attempts by plaintiffs to make an end-run around the obstacles
posed by defamation law's harm to reputation element and its constitutional aspects." (footnote
omitted)); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1999) ("What
Food Lion sought to do, then, was to recover defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort
claims, without satisfying the stricter (First Amendment) standards of a defamation claim. We
believe that such an end-run around First Amendment strictures is foreclosed by Hustler.").
365. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001). Notably, in Bartnicki the publisher was
not implicated in the illegal effort to acquire the information at issue.
366. Id.
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illegally intercepted and recorded. While it did not categorically
conclude that all publications of truthful information are
constitutionally protected, it adhered to its practice in past cases that
"'if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest
order."'

367

If lying is protected insofar as it does not cause cognizable injury,
and if publication harms short of defamation are generally not
cognizable, then lying for the purpose of facilitating a politically
significant investigation will generally be protected speech. The lie told
by an undercover investigator-denying a desire to document food
safety issues, for example-does not cause a harm other than those
caused by the ultimate publication, and such injuries are not legally
cognizable if the publication is non-defamatory. 368
VI. CONCLUSION

Lies play a surprisingly important historic role in uncovering
truth. Investigative deceptions are the hallmark of the journalistic
tradition. Since the time of Upton Sinclair's work at a meatpacking
plant, gaining access or even employment through deception has led to
landmark legislative reforms, shaped public opinion, and ignited
political debate. These tactics are now routinely used by government
investigators and political activists as well. Notably, however, over the
past few years, dozens of states have considered legislation that
criminalizes misrepresentations used to gain access to a business for
purposes of an undercover investigation. These laws-Ag Gag statutes
a timely opportunity to
and their statutory parallelS 369-present
consider the appropriate degree of constitutional protection for lies.
On this point, we conclude with two thoughts. First, although we
have not emphasized the point in this Article, it is extremely important

367. Id. at 528 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)).
368. One could imagine that if the investigator not only lies but stages the reported conduct,
then damages would exist. Cf. Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125,
1139-40 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that when the "unedited footage" from an undercover
investigation would show that the publication created a "false impression," then an action for
defamation is colorable).
369. Strictly speaking, some anti-access statutes are not Ag Gag laws, but they raise some of
the same concerns. For example, statutes that criminalize all investigations except for those done
by a licensed private investigator would likely raise serious constitutional challenges in an asapplied challenge by an activist or media organization. Similarly, laws that would criminalize
investigative misrepresentations in all industries would present the same, serious First
Amendment concerns as Ag Gag laws.
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to note that, despite any dictum to the contrary, there is no wellestablished precedent categorically banishing all false statements from
First Amendment protection, and this is particularly true in the context
of investigative deceptions. On this basis alone one would assume that
investigative misrepresentations are protected speech and any effort to
ban such speech would reflect an effort to carve out a new category of
unprotected expression, something the Court has indicated it is loath to
do.
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Second, and no less important, whatever the ultimate status of
lies generally under the First Amendment, investigative deceptions are
high value lies, and laws regulating them should be subject to the most
exacting constitutional scrutiny. For decades, the Court has classified
lies on a dichotomy: either they are entirely unprotected, or they are a
form of speech that is disfavored, but protected only insofar as is
necessary to avoid chilling valuable speech. By comprehensively
identifying the doctrinal, theoretical, and historical case for recognizing
the distinct value in investigative deceptions, this Article challenges the
misconception that all lies are equal. Many lies are entitled to First
Amendment protection, but no lie is more valuable than the lie that
enables important speech on issues of public concern. High value lies
have evaded judicial attention for too long, and with the rise of Ag Gag
laws, their time in the First Amendment spotlight has finally arrived.
As we demonstrate, in the context of lies, the First Amendment
critically intersects with the law of causation, and because the harm
flowing from an investigation is linked to publication or expos6 and not
the lie itself, investigative deceptions are entitled to robust
constitutional protection.
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See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).

